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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I evaluate two approaches that have the potential to improve child
welfare, which persists at high levels in the developing world. In the first essay, I evaluate
whether the Indian government’s child nutrition intervention, the Integrated Child
Development Services (ICDS) is able to reduce long-term malnutrition in children as
measured by stunting. The ICDS provides supplements, peri-natal services, and daycare to
targeted villages, and is one of many such programs in the developing world . Previous
evaluations of ICDS have not adequately controlled for its targeted nature, introducing
downward bias in their estimates, nor have such evaluations in India or elsewhere looked at
the program’s distributional effects. Controlling for targeting and using new data, I find
significant treatment effects particularly for the most malnourished children. Unlike
previous studies, I control for non-normality of ICDS coverage; however, like previous work,
I find problems with the targeting of the program: while ICDS targets poor areas, it fails
to target those with low average education or with unbalanced sex ratios.
In the second essay, I examine the impact of an Indian women’s empowerment program,
Mahila Samakhya on empowerment outcomes. The program aims to empower women
through education and by organizing them into support groups. First, I use primary data
on 487 women in the state of Uttarakhand to match non-participants with untreated
women and establish that the program is not targeted at any particular part of the
population. Then, matching women over districts with and without the program, I show
that program participants are more likely to (1) work, (2) attend village council meetings,
(3) have identification cards to a government employment scheme that give them access to
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outside employment, and (3) leave the house without permission. My results thus establish
that the Mahila Samakhya significantly improves gender empowerment. This study is only
the second evaluation of the Mahila Samakhya program and the first to evaluate whether it
improves female empowerment. This study is also the first to explore the how employment
and social norm might differ in their impact on female empowerment.
In the third essay, I quantify the impact of peer network-based learning and influence on
female empowerment and child food intake using primary data on networks in
Uttarakhand. I use participation in the Mahila Samakhya program to identify increases in
the empowerment of the participant herself and her social network. Using a conceptual
framework that combines the Nash bargaining framework, the demographic diffusion
literature, and identity economics, I characterize three ways in which networks function:
social learning, social influence, and identity utility. I then use 3SLS on network-weighted
instruments to estimate the relative sizes of these mechanisms on empowerment and child
food intake. Results show that female empowerment is significantly affected by social
influence and identity through participation, while child food intake benefits most from
learning.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“There are people in the world so hungry, that God cannot appear to them
except in the form of bread.”– Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
Over a third of all children in developing countries continue to be malnourished (Smith and
Haddad, 2000). Malnutrition early in a child’s life can lower educational attainment and
lifetime earnings (Alderman et al., 2006b). Thus, investments in the welfare of children
lead to more productive adults and greater national income (Mayer, 2001). Economic
growth, on the other hand, need not guarantee improvements in child welfare. Indian
per-capita income has more than doubled since the mid-nineties. Agricultural production is
at an all-time high, and large buffer stocks of cereals lie in government granaries. Such
economic and agricultural success notwithstanding, over 40 percent of all Indian children
are malnourished, compared to 33 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (Gragnolati et al., 2005).
In this dissertation, I examine two ways of improving child welfare using primary and
secondary data from India. The first works through the integrated delivery of key services
including nutrition supplementation, pre- and post-natal care, vaccinations, and daycare
facilities. Although such programs tend to be targeted at the most vulnerable households
and are free, worldwide the utilization of such programs tends to be low, and estimated
effects are negligible. I use nationally representative data to examine the Indian Integrated
Child Development Services to find that although the program improves long-term child
nutrition, its impact is too small to end India’s struggle with child hunger and malnutrition.
The rest of my dissertation focuses on a second way of improving child nutrition:
through gender empowerment. A large and growing body of literature suggests that
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mothers invest more than fathers in their children. Women who can influence their
household’s resource allocation have healthier children than those who cannot (Maitra,
2004; Thomas et al., 2002; Quisumbing and de la Brie`re, 2000). Traditionally, economists
have looked at education, contraceptive use, and asset ownership as determinants of
empowerment. But improving educational attainment, changing contraceptive use or
asset-ownership first calls for changing rigid social norms that prevent women from getting
an education, using contraceptives or owning assets.
Empowering a woman to control a greater share of her household’s resources depends on
her notion of identity and social norms,1 as well as the interaction of these forces. However,
even in areas where norms are rigid and patriarchal, friends are always present to provide
information and influence behavior, thus helping define identity. I study whether
harnessing the power of preexisting peer networks can help change norms to make these
norms friendlier to women. In the second and third essays, I use primary data from rural
north India to study the impact of a community-level empowerment program, Mahila
Samakhya, that empowers women through education and strengthens and diversifies
networks, on female autonomy and child welfare.
In the second essay, I test whether Mahila Samakhya participants are in fact more
empowered than non-participants. I also test to see whether the program is targeted at the
worst-off women, which would entail correcting for program placement to avoid
underestimating the program’s effect. I examine whether participants are in fact more
physically mobile, have better access to employment, and more active in community-level
politics. The Mahila Samakhya program primarily aims to provide education and thus
improve employability, but may also have significant spillover effects on female
empowerment through information flows and peer networks. Thus, I compare the
empowerment levels of women who participate in the program but do not work— and thus
1A social norm refers to the behavioral expectations within society or a sub-group of society. Norms
organize individual’s beliefs and interactions when there is more than one possible equilibrium (Young,
2008).
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do not benefit from the improved employment aspect of the program— with untreated
women to find evidence of any such spillover effects.
After estimating the employability and spillover effects of the program on participants,
in the third essay, I study further examine the spillover effect. I provide evidence that such
a spillover effect likely works through networks, and ask whether the empowerment of a
woman’s peers affects her own empowerment. Going beyond most of the literature on peer
networks, I decompose the causal peer effect into its component mechanisms of social
learning, social influence, and identity utility. Finally, I consider the impact of own and
friends’ empowerment on children’s food intake. The second and third essays thus help
answer whether and how peers can affect female empowerment and therefore child welfare.
My results suggest that traditional empowerment or child welfare interventions may benefit
from explicitly incorporating peer networks into program design.
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CHAPTER 2
BEYOND AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS: THE
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILD NUTRITION
OUTCOMES AND PROGRAM PLACEMENT IN
INDIA’S ICDS
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Malnutrition early in a child’s life can lower educational attainment and lifetime
earnings Alderman et al. (2006b). Indias Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) is
one of several programs in the developing world that target long-term nutrition and
development of children. This program provides nutritional supplements, vaccinations,
health checkups and referral services, and day care. Much of the literature evaluating these
programs finds little or no evidence of significant, sizable causal effects on chronic child
malnutrition. In this situation, the evaluation of causal impact is complicated by numerous
factors. First, causal effects depend on the details of the program and on their context;
reductions to long-term child malnutrition need not occur homogeneously with a direct
effect. Further, most integrated programs are endogenously placed to target areas of most
need, making effective placement of centers crucial to their success. Globally, children from
rural and agricultural communities face reduced access to health-care facilities, which in
turn renders them particularly vulnerable to the long-term effects of malnutrition. Hence,
the impact of ICDS on chronic child malnutrition is relevant not only for Indian
policy-makers but also for similar program design in other developing countries.
I evaluate ICDS on two main counts: whether the program has a positive treatment
effect on the long-term nutrition of targeted children and whether program placement
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effectively targets vulnerable segments of the population. I use data from the nationally
representative Indian National Family and Health Survey of 2005-06 or NFHS-3 (IIPS and
Macro, 2007) and take standardized height-for-age Z-scores (HAZ scores) to reflect
long-term child nutritional status. ICDS is the largest program of its kind globally; it has
been in place since 1977 and although it cost approximately $1.5 billion in 2008, previous
evaluations using data from 1998-99 and earlier showed no evidence of its effectiveness
(Das Gupta et al., 2005; Gragnolati et al., 2005). Recently, the Bank (2007) recommended
that the Indian government redesign the ICDS for a total cost of $9.5 billion. The hefty
price tag of redesign, its potential impact on poor households, and the availability of new
data motivate this re-evaluation of the impact of the ICDS.
This evaluation of the ICDS contributes to the debate on evaluation of integrated child
development program on several counts. First, since ICDS targets children who would
otherwise be malnourished, I use Propensity Score Matching to control for endogenous
placement. Second, in addition to treatment effects for the entire sample, I also estimate
treatment effects for the moderately stunted and severely stunted to determine whether
ICDS decreased long-term malnutrition in most-at-risk children. Third, I also estimate
these distributional effects for earlier waves of NFHS data to examine whether by focusing
on the entire distribution, previous evaluations missed evidence of impact on the most
vulnerable. Fourth, although most analyses of program placement (for ICDS, see
Das Gupta et al. (2005)) rely on probit regressions to study targeting the distribution of
state-wise ICDS coverage exhibits negative skewness which violates normality required by
probit. In this paper, I use beta regression to control for the negative skewness of coverage
to determine whether program placement works as intended. Comparison with probit
specifications highlights the importance of accounting for skewness. Finally, I use newly
available household survey data as well as budget data from the Indian government to
evaluate ICDS. These approaches reveal unambiguous evidence that ICDS significantly
reduces long-term child malnutrition in India.
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I conduct my analysis in two steps: first, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) identifies the
effect of ICDS on HAZ scores. Second, probit and beta regression examine the placement
of ICDS in villages as a function of the observables on which the government bases its
placement decision, namely population, average income, district-level sex ratios, and
infrastructure. PSM shows ICDS increases average HAZ scores by approximately six
percent; this effect size is larger than estimated treatment effects from similar programs in
other developing countries. I also find significant treatment effects for the worst-off
children, girls in particular. Treatment effect estimates thus suggest ICDS significantly
reduces chronic child malnutrition.
Placement results suggest that while ICDS effectively targets poor areas with risky water
sources, sex ratios and landholdings do not play a significant role in placement. ICDS
targets areas with more educated mothers, which appears regressive because villages with
fewer educated people might benefit most from the intervention. I also find that voting
patterns correlate with the allocation of national ICDS funds to states while the states
chronic child malnutrition levels do not. In summary, my results show that while ICDS
significantly increases HAZ scores, program placement fails to target villages in most need,
and political alliances play an important role in budget allocation. This paper contributes
by being the first in this literature to estimate distributional treatment effects for HAZ
scores due to ICDS. This paper also highlights the importance of accounting for the nature
of the data distribution in estimating, say, program placement. Finally, this paper is the
first to find evidence of a significant impact of ICDS on chronic child malnutrition.
2.2 Literature Review
Although real Indian GDP per capita doubled in the last fifteen years (Group, 2007), child
stunting only decreased by sixteen percent over the same period: 69 percent of children
under five were stunted in 1992-93 (NFHS-1), 68 percent in 1998-99 (NFHS-2), and 58
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percent in 2005-06 (NFHS-3). Further, data from the NFHS-3 show that 45.9 percent of all
Indian children are severely undernourished (three or more standard deviations from the
global reference mean for any nutritional indicator). The Indian government takes a
two-step approach to reducing child malnutrition: a Public Distribution System makes
food available at subsidized prices, and the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)
provides nutritional supplements, bundled child and maternal services, and day-care
facilities to targeted households.
Evaluations of integrated child development programs in most developing countries have
yielded little evidence of an impact on HAZ scores. Walker et al. (1996) find that early
childhood food supplementation does not improve HAZ scores in Jamaica, while one study
reports that a nutrition education program in South Africa failed to affect HAZ scores
although it had significant positive effects on other measures of nutrition (Walsh et al.,
2002). Similarly, Armecin et al. (2006) evaluate a Philippine early child development
program to find significant positive effects on short-term nutrition and on cognitive, social,
motor and language development but not on HAZ scores. An evaluation of a Peruvian milk
subsidy program, Vaso de Leche finds that although the intervention is well-targeted, it
failed to significantly improve child nutrition (Stifel and Alderman, 2003). In contrast, a
few studies find integrated child nutritional programs have a small impact on HAZ scores.
Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) find that the Mexican PROGRESA caused a three percent
decrease in the probability of a child being stunted. Thus the lack of evidence of a large
and statistically significant effect of ICDS on HAZ scores appears to be the norm rather
than an exception. Worldwide, chronic malnutrition as measured by HAZ scores appears to
be the hardest measure to improve.
A rich literature surrounds the evaluation of other non-integrated child nutrition
interventions. This literature tends to find that providing early childhood nutrition
intervention significantly improves health and educational attainment, even in adulthood.
For instance, a study uses panel data from Guatemala to evaluate the impact of an
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intervention that provided protein supplements from 1969-77 (Maluccio et al., 2009). The
authors use a sub-sample of children younger than seven at the time of the intervention to
find participation increased schooling and standardized test scores 25 years after the
intervention. Similar evidence suggests that a Chinese national salt iodization intervention
halved goiter rates (Gillespie et al., 2001). Unconditional cash transfers also appear to
significantly improve child nutrition: a study of the South African unconditional cash
transfer program to find it significantly improves child height-for-age, and results in a large
earning gain in adulthood (Aguero et al., 2006). Paxson and Schady (2007) study the
Ecuadorean unconditional cash transfer program to find it improves child nutrition, but
not other outcomes such as visits to health clinics or parenting practices. In a unique,
non-causal approach, Naschold and Barrett (2010) use stochastic dominance to find
evidence that public expenditure is correlated with a positive impact on the nutritional
outcomes of the worst-off children. In summary, while integrated programs appear to fail
to significantly reduce child stunting, cash transfers and focused nutritional
supplementation might significantly reduce child malnutrition.
ICDS targets the physical and psychological development of children younger than six in
the most vulnerable and economically disadvantaged sections of the population. Village
ICDS centers provide food supplements, health care including immunizations and referral
services, and information on nutrition and health. Centers also provide early childhood
care, daycare and preschool education (of Women and Development, 2009). The
government directs ICDS funds through a two stage targeting process. First, the national
government provides each state with an ICDS budget based on state-level development
characteristics. Each state then uses its ICDS budget to place centers in villages based on
village-level development characteristics. Community-level surveys and the enumeration of
families living below the poverty line provide national and state governments information
on development characteristics like poverty rates, infrastructure, and health outcomes. The
government also hopes to reduce the incidence of female infanticide and feticide by placing
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ICDS in areas with significantly fewer girls than boys. In addition to providing nutritional
support, ICDS centers provide information on the benefits of investing in daughters.
Evaluations of ICDS tend to concur that implementation issues limit its effectiveness. A
major World Bank evaluation (Gragnolati et al., 2005) finds that while using all the
services provided by local ICDS centers might result in health and nutritional benefits,
most families use only nutritional supplements, immunization services, or day care facilities,
which yield insignificant benefits. Other studies have identified similar limitations, albeit
on a smaller scale. A study of a sample of 610 children under the age of three receiving full,
partial, or no services through ICDS over a one-year period (Saiyed and Seshadri, 2000).
Although full utilization of ICDS services results in a significant improvement in stunting,
wasting, and weight-for-age, partial utilization has a much smaller impact.
The multi-agency Indian Coalition for Sustainable Nutrition Security contends that food
supplementation as delivered by the ICDS may not be the optimal nutrition intervention.
The Coalition argues that immunization services and parental counseling may have a
greater effect on stunting than food supplements. However, researchers have found that
ICDS fails to improve parenting practices and is often unable to provide necessary medical
referrals. Prinja et al. (2008) study 60 ICDS centers in the Northwestern state of Haryana
and find that participation in an ICDS center affects neither breastfeeding patterns nor the
involvement of the mother in the child’s growth monitoring. Gragnolati et al. (2005)
observe that ICDS centers provide minimal parental counseling and often lack linkages
with the health sector. Although much of an individual’s nutritional status is determined
in the first three years of life, an evaluation (Das Gupta et al., 2005) finds that ICDS
services are more likely to reach children older than three.
The ICDS redesign project is motivated by the studies discussed above which find that
ICDS does not have a significant impact on child stunting, wasting, or anemia. However,
recent work (Gragnolati et al., 2005) is based solely on summary statistics of earlier waves
of the data I use in this paper. Other major evaluations (of Public Cooperation and
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Development, 1992); (Das Gupta et al., 2005), conduct econometric analyses but use older
data. The Indian government places ICDS centers in target areas of high malnutrition, but
most previous studies evaluating ICDS fail to control for such endogeneity, leading to
downward biased results. The notable exception is an evaluation (Das Gupta et al., 2005)
that uses matching techniques to control for targeted program placement. However, this
study (Das Gupta et al., 2005) restrict its analysis of ICDS impact to estimating average
treatment effects for the entire distribution. Since ICDS aims to target children of most
need, this paper estimates treatment effects for the worst-off children in addition to average
treatment effects for the whole sample.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
2.3.1 Description of the Dataset
Data are from the third round of the Indian National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) of
2005-2006. The first NFHS survey was conducted in 1992-93 and the second in 1998-99.
The NFHS-3 applied a module from the Demographic and Health Survey to a sub-sample
of 36,850 randomly chosen women who had given birth to at least one child in the past five
years. This sub-sample covered 3842 villages in all 29 Indian states. Urban and rural
samples within each state were drawn separately and the sample within each state was
allocated proportionally to the size of the states urban and rural populations. The rural
sample was selected in two stages: first stage selection of primary sampling units (villages)
with probability proportional to population size, followed by the random selection of
households within each village (IIPS and Macro, 2007). This module measured the height,
weight, and hemoglobin content of 31,556 women and collected the same anthropometric
measures for 41,306 of their children below the age of five. Anthropometric measures are
not reported for 1385 women and their children or slightly over four percent of the
sub-sample.
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Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) do not report income figures. Instead DHS
report a wealth index that is a summary measure of asset ownership (land, livestock,
jewelry, vehicles), housing characteristics (material and quality of roof, walls and floor), and
ownership of durables (television, radio). The wealth index is a score variable generated
from factor analysis on the ownership of 33 assets and household characteristics from the
survey instrument. Each asset is assigned a weight and normalized asset scores are
assigned to each household, which in turn has a factor score (Gwatkin et al., 2000). Factor
scores are then summed to get a household-specific wealth index. The resultant index
indicates the level of wealth consistent with expenditure and income (Rutstein, 1999).
In previous rounds, the NFHS provided district- and village-level data that could be
used to compute the probability of a village hosting an ICDS center. These data included
distance to the district headquarters, connection to an all-weather road and train station,
any history of epidemics in the past two years, average household wealth, village sex ratio,
percentage of mothers with primary and secondary education, and whether the village had
electricity. Since the NFHS-3 includes HIV testing data for a small sample of the
population, any geographic identifiers below the state-level were scrambled to protect the
identity of tested individuals. While villages are not identified, it is possible to tell which
people live in the same village. Therefore, to determine the likelihood of a village receiving
ICDS coverage, I developed village-level aggregates using available data. I was able to
generate the average household wealth of the village, sex ratio, percentage of mothers with
primary and secondary education, average landholding size, use of irrigation, availability of
drainage and electricity. Robustness checks presented at the end of this paper show that
results are unlikely to have been contaminated by the lack of village-level data.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows that the average woman in the sample of mothers was 27 years old and
had completed four years of education. Her first (and in most cases only) marriage
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occurred when she was eighteen and she had an average 3 births ever and 1.6 births in the
past five years. Only 29 percent of surveyed respondents were working at the time of the
survey. About 74 percent of the respondents lived in areas covered by the ICDS. Slightly
over half of all ICDS centers had been present in the village for over a decade. Since the
average child in this sample was two years old, most children had lived in either an ICDS
village or a non-ICDS village their entire lives.
The average child in this sample was 1.7 standard deviations (SD) below the WHO
reference mean height-for-age. Boys were 1.73 SD below the mean, while girls were 1.68 SD
below the mean. The difference between male and female child HAZ scores was -0.05,
significant at the 95 percent level, implying that on average boys were worse-off. 23 percent
of children were moderately stunted (two to three standard deviations below the global
reference HAZ score mean), while 21 percent were severely stunted (three or more standard
deviations below the global reference HAZ score mean); a total of 43.9 percent of all
children younger than five were either moderately or severely stunted. (Full summary
statistics available from author.)
Since ICDS centers are endogenously placed to target poor villages, household wealth is
likely to predict a familys utilization of ICDS services. To explore the impact of wealth on
the effectiveness of ICDS, I present two sets of kernel density estimates– one controlling for
wealth and the other not. Figure 2.1 presents a series of six kernel density estimates
showing the distribution of HAZ scores for children living in ICDS villages and those from
non-ICDS villages; the first panel shows the kernel density estimates for all children, while
the next five are by quintiles of the wealth index. For the entire sample, the distribution of
HAZ scores for children from ICDS-covered districts has a higher mass below the mean,
which suggests these children are more likely to be malnourished and that centers are
placed in areas of most need but do not appear to significantly improve outcomes.
However, in the poorest quintile, ICDS appears to increase average HAZ scores: children
from ICDS villages are more likely to be just above the mean. Similarly, in the next two
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poorest quintiles, ICDS covered children seem less likely to be below the mean than those
from non-ICDS areas. These graphs indicate that among the poorest, children from ICDS
villages have higher HAZ scores than those from non-ICDS villages. The picture is perhaps
clearest for the fourth quintile.
In the fourth quintile, the ICDS appears to shift out the distribution of HAZ scores:
ICDS covered children are less likely to be below the mean and more likely to be at or
above the mean. In the richest quintile, the two distributions overlap for the most part
indicating the lack of a significant difference between ICDS and non-ICDS villages for the
wealth. These kernel density plots emphasize the importance of controlling for wealth:
when not controlling for income, ICDS appears not to have any impact on HAZ scores
while after controlling for income, ICDS coverage tends to be correlated with higher HAZ
scores in all but the richest quintile.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 The Impact of the ICDS
Appropriate placement of ICDS centers implies endogenous program placement, which
creates selection bias. To control for bias from endogenous program placement, a previous
study used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) on the first two rounds of the NFHS
(1992-93 and 1998-99) and find that, on average, ICDS fails to increase HAZ
scores (Das Gupta et al., 2005). PSM controls for endogenous program placement by
matching treated individuals to untreated individuals on a conditional probability measure
of treatment participation. PSM allows the comparison of treated individuals to a control
group using observables such as demographic and economic characteristics to construct the
control group. Like Das Gupta et al. (2005), I use PSM to measure the impact of ICDS on
HAZ scores. However, the above study only estimated the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) of the ICDS over the entire survey sample, which may have masked a
13
positive impact on target groups. In this paper, I extend the analysis by estimating
treatment effects for moderately and severely stunted children, in addition to estimating an
ATT for the full sample.
The notion of propensity scores is useful in the context of non-random treatment
assignment. The propensity score is a conditional probability measure of treatment
participation, given observable characteristics, x, and is expressed as follows:
Pi(x) = P [Di = 1|X = x], (2.1)
given that the balancing condition is satisfied (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). PSM
eliminates selection bias if controlling for x eliminates selection bias from endogenous
placement (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Since in the current data, not every
community-level characteristic which should determine participation in ICDS is available,
it is possible that the observed x variables do not entirely eliminate selection bias. Each
child in ICDS areas is matched with replacement with one from areas without ICDS based
on the propensity score of each child. In this paper, I use kernel matching in which all
treated observations are matched with a weighted average of the propensity score for all
control observations. I also conducted PSM using metrics other than kernel (Mahalanobis,
nearest neighbor, and caliper); results were similar in size and significance. Weights are
inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated and control
observations (Becker and Ichino, 2002). I conduct this matching based on observed factors
that likely affect both ICDS participation and HAZ scores: age, birth order and sex of the
child, the mothers age, education, caste, and religion, household wealth, village population
and other community-level development indicators (Das Gupta et al., 2005), and then test
for the significance of differences in HAZ scores, maintaining the unconfoundedness
assumption (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009):
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Di ⊥ (Yi(1), Yi(0))|Pi(x) (2.2)
where ⊥ signifies independence. The unconfoundedness assumption implies treatment
assignment, Di is independent of HAZ scores, Yi after controlling for propensity scores, or
that there are no unobservables that affect HAZ scores and probability of treatment.
I conducted PSM in STATA using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) for 28,935
ICDS-treated and 8,853 control children for whom the NFHS-3 provides anthropometric
measures. Table 2.2 presents the results of matching analysis for the entire distribution and
the two lowest quartiles of the distribution of HAZ scores. Unmatched observations over
the entire distribution in the upper panel suggest that children in ICDS villages are shorter
for their age than children from non-ICDS villages. ICDS appears to have a significant
negative impact on child nutrition. However, matched results in the lower panel show that
ICDS significantly increases HAZ scores. Children who live in ICDS villages have five
percent higher HAZ scores than the average matched child from a non-ICDS village,
highlighting the importance of controlling for the targeted program placement. Over the
entire sample, ICDS has a greater effect on the HAZ scores of boys: those from ICDS
villages are over six percent closer to the global average height-for-age than boys from
non-ICDS villages, while treated girls are four percent closer to the mean than untreated
girls. These results contrast with the insignificant (and sometimes negative) estimates of
ATT from matching on the first two waves of NFHS data (Das Gupta et al., 2005). Since
the matching algorithm employed here is as close as possible to the one used by
Das Gupta et al. (2005), the difference in results suggests that ICDS has become more
effective in the five years between the second and third waves of the NFHS.
In contrast to results over the entire sample, matched results for moderately stunted (2
to 3 standard deviations below the reference HAZ mean) and severely stunted children (3
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or more standard deviations below the reference HAZ mean) show that girls benefit more
from ICDS than boys. However, the increase in HAZ scores due to ICDS is smaller than for
the entire sample: severely stunted girls are only two percent closer to not being stunted
while moderately stunted girls are only one percent better off. Neither moderately stunted
boys nor severely stunted ones are significantly better off than untreated boys, suggesting
that the worst-off girls benefit disproportionately from ICDS relative to the worst-off boys.
Rose (1999) documents the presence of a “son syndrome” in parts of rural India where
boys are better off than girls, not the other way around. Perhaps ICDS changes parental
practices ever so slightly and leads to a more equitable distribution of household resources.
Alternatively, the worst-off girls might benefit disproportionately from the free medical and
nutritional services provided by ICDS that they would not have received otherwise. In
either case, ICDS appears to somewhat mitigate the effects of the son syndrome.
I also estimate treatment effects for moderately and severely stunted children using
NFHS-1 and NFHS-2 data. The results, presented in tables 2.3 and 2.4 show little of
significance for the entire distribution. However, distributional treatment effects for the
earlier waves yield more information. NFHS-1 data suggest ICDS increased boys’ HAZ
scores (consistent with Das Gupta et al.); the distributional effects tell us this improvement
comes from the ICDS’ impact on severely stunted boys. NFHS-2 data suggest that while
ICDS had no impact on average, it did significantly increase HAZ scores of moderately
stunted boys. By comparison, NFHS-3 data tell us stunted boys did not significantly
benefit from ICDS, although stunted girls did. This change in pattern might indicate an
increased focus on tackling the son syndrome through ICDS. Focusing on the entire
distribution would have caused us to overlook these changes in effectiveness.
Since HAZ scores are largely determined in the first two or three years of an infant’s life,
I estimate ICDS impact on HAZ scores for children younger than two and three. Tables 2.5
presents evidence of significant positive treatment effects for children younger than two and
three of both sexes. Once again, we observe the importance of controlling for endogeneity
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via matching since unmatched results show a significant and large negative effect of the
ICDS. These results suggest that ICDS significantly improves the nutritional outcomes of
children in their vital formative years.
The 1385 missing observations in the anthropometric sub-sample of NFHS-3 may be of
econometric concern. If these 1385 women were systematically unhealthier than the other
women, the infants they give birth to would also likely be unhealthy. These children may
have benefited disproportionately from ICDS intervention; by not including them in the
sample, we may be underestimating the effect of the ICDS. Conversely, if the mother is
simply too sick to look after her child or to take her child to the ICDS center, these
children may be foregoing any of the ICDS benefits, despite living in an ICDS village. If
this case is true, results would overestimate the impact of having an ICDS center in the
area. While missing measurements may introduce a source of bias, I am unable to
conclusively determine the direction of this bias.
2.4.2 Program Placement
The presence of significant positive treatment effects for moderately and severely stunted
children indicates that ICDS provides vital assistance for the most at-risk Indian children.
In order to determine whether the program effectively targets these children, I study the
placement of ICDS centers in this section. As described above, national and state
governments target ICDS centers to reach (1) large population points with (2) the most
vulnerable households in (3) unequal, low-income areas with (4) unbalanced sex ratios, (5)
inferior infrastructure, and (6) poor development outcomes, although no explicit targeting
formula is provided. If placement is effective, state- and village- level values of the target
criteria should influence the amount of funds allocated at each level. In this section, I
examine program placement at both levels to see whether the allocation of funds and
placement of centers actually follows the stated criteria. To study national-level placement,
I examine the determinants of the amount of national ICDS funds allocated to a state.
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However, since the data do not allow geographic identification of districts, I cannot use
budget allocation for state-level placement analysis. Instead, I use two dependent variables
on the placement of ICDS centers in a village: the first is whether a village has an ICDS
center and the second is the proportion of villages in a state that have ICDS centers.
To address the six ICDS placement goals listed above, I estimate state-level coverage as
a function of available and constructed village characteristics. These characteristics
examine the goal of targeting (1) large population points by using linear and quadratic
village population terms, (2) poor areas through average wealth of the village, average
landholding (in acres), average irrigated landholding (in acres), (3) unequal areas with
state-wise Gini coefficients (Jenkins, 2010) that increase with inequality, (4) areas with
unbalanced sex ratios through the share of girls of the population, (5) inferior
infrastructure using electrification, a dummy for rural areas, and (6) development outcomes
via the share of mothers with a primary or secondary education, and whether over half the
village population does not have access to improved water sources, i.e. household
connections, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection.
Das Gupta et al. used more detailed village characteristics that are not available in the
NFHS-3; I subsume these variables in the rural dummy. Although the dummy variable for
rural areas will be correlated with land holdings, I expect the rural dummy to capture
unobserved community-level factors which partly determine participation probability, like
the presence of other development programs, which tend to target rural areas.
Das Gupta et al. (2005) study the placement of ICDS centers at the national- and state-
levels using probit analysis. They use a specification without state dummy variables for
national level placement, and the one with state dummies for state-level placement.
However, as Figure 2.2 shows, the state-wise distribution of ICDS centers has negative
skewness. Probit analysis assumes normally distributed errors and the probit link function
derives from the normal distribution, both of which invalidate the use of probit for
evaluating asymmetric distributions like the one in Figure 2.2. Beta distributions are useful
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in modeling proportions (variables continuously distributed on the (0,1) interval) such as
state-level ICDS coverage because the distribution can assume a variety of shapes,
depending on the governing shape parameters α and β. Ferrari and Francisco (2004)
present a beta regression which assumes the dependent variable is beta distributed on the
interval (0,1) with shape parameters determined by the mean and dispersion of the
empirical density function. The key assumption underlying beta regression is that the
parameters are beta distributed. Thus, from a theoretical perspective beta regression is the
superior estimation strategy.
To demonstrate the value of accounting for negative skewness in state-level ICDS
coverage, I estimate both probit specifications used by Das Gupta et al. and the beta
regression. The dependent variable in the beta regression is the state-wise proportion of
villages covered by ICDS. This specification presents an alternative to probit in studying
state-level placement. I compare results from the beta regression to results from the two
probit specifications (dependent variable is whether a village has ICDS) and highlight the
differences in determinants of state-level placement. The first column (probit I) in
Table 2.6 presents probit estimates without state dummies (national-level placement in Das
Gupta et al.), while the second column (probit II) presents estimates with state dummies
(state-level placement in Das Gupta et al.). Beta regression estimates are presented in the
third column of Table 2.6. According to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the
probit specification with state dummies (probit II) performs better than the probit
specification without state dummy variables (probit I), which would be expected since
omitting state-level indicator variables overlooks state-level heterogeneity. Further, a test
for the significance of state dummies strongly rejects the null that the dummies were
insignificant (with P = 0.00 and χ2(27) = 273.32). While probit II is more reliable than
probit I, negative skewness in ICDS coverage suggests beta regression better describes
state-level placement.
Placement results highlight several important differences among the beta and two probit
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specifications: a lack of access to an improved water source significantly reduces
participation probability according to probit, but increases coverage in beta regression.
Electrification also significantly increases coverage according to beta and probit I
specifications, but not probit II. The electrification dummy was significant and positive in
both specifications in Das Gupta et al., so the lack of significance in probit II suggests
ICDS is being expanded to cover more disadvantaged areas. In contrast to probit results
and stated target criteria, beta regression indicates that rural areas are not significantly
more likely to receive ICDS coverage.
Although ICDS policy is to target large population points, the beta regression suggests
an increase in average village population decreases state-level ICDS coverage. However,
probit results suggest that the government targets large population centers. The beta
regression result also contrasts with Das Gupta et al.’s finding of a significant positive
correlation between population and ICDS coverage at the state level. This change in sign
suggests that ICDS now targets smaller population points; perhaps an indicator of overall
expansion in ICDS coverage over time. Also in contrast to stated policy, a change in the
share of girls in total population does not significantly affect the probability of
participation in either probit or beta specification, which is consistent with Das Gupta et
al.’s results. In keeping with policy and Das Gupta et al.’s results, poorer villages are more
likely to receive ICDS coverage at the state level. Further, areas with greater income
inequality, i.e. with a higher value of the Gini coefficient, receive greater ICDS coverage.
The two probit estimates of the Gini coefficient reverse signs, and have magnitudes that
are considerably smaller than the beta regression, further suggesting the unreliability of
probit in this context.
Other measures of economic welfare yield less convincing evidence of targeted placement.
For instance, while average land holdings do not significantly affect placement, villages
with larger irrigated landholdings receive more ICDS coverage, contradicting the policy of
targeting areas with poor infrastructure. Again, results underline the difference between
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probit and beta specifications as probit analysis suggests that size of irrigated landholdings
does not significantly influence placement. All three specifications show that areas with
more mothers with primary or secondary education receive greater ICDS. Das Gupta et al.
(2005) report an insignificant positive correlation between the proportion of educated
mothers and ICDS coverage; the increase in significance from their analysis to mine
suggests the government is increasing targeting areas with more educated people between
the NFHS rounds.
Placement results underline important differences from stated policy: unbalanced sex
ratios do not influence state-level coverage, and electrified villages are more likely to receive
ICDS coverage. Areas with more educated mothers are targeted rather than areas with
worse levels of educational attainment. Population is inversely correlated with state
placement, although stated policy is to target large population points. On the other hand,
a decrease in average wealth increases state-level ICDS coverage while a lack of access to
improved water sources increases placement probability; both results are consistent with
the objective of targeting poor areas. Thus targeting appears to work for wealth and some
development indicators, but fails in other important aspects like sex ratio, average
educational attainment, and infrastructure. Villages without many educated mothers or
electrification may also benefit most from ICDS, so the government should improve its
coverage of these villages.
I study national placement of ICDS centers by examining the disbursement of ICDS
funds to states by the federal government. The government claims to allocate federal ICDS
funds to rural areas based on state poverty rates, population, stunting prevalence, women’s
education rates, and the sex ratio. I regress the share of national ICDS funds given to a
state on the state’s wealth and Gini coefficient, population (linear and quadratic terms),
the natural log of HAZ scores, the natural log of mothers with primary and secondary
education, the proportion of the state that is rural, and the sex ratio. I also include the
percent of the state’s votes for the ruling coalition and an interaction term between wealth
21
and percent of votes. Results presented in Table 2.7 show that given the state’s wealth,
votes for the political alliance that won the 2004 national election have a greater positive
impact on fund allocation for richer states. In contrast, the states observed level of child
malnutrition is uncorrelated with the allocation of national-level funds. Political alliances
should not be correlated with the funds a state receives from the federal government but
they appear to be; malnutrition levels should affect national allocation of ICDS but they
do not.
2.5 Sensitivity Analyses
The following robustness checks address uncertainty over the quality of matching and bias
from unobserved village-level characteristics contaminating the treatment effects.
2.5.1 Unconfoundedness Assumption
If the unconfoundedness assumption is invalid, i.e. if there are unobservables that affect
HAZ scores and the probability of treatment even after controlling for propensity scores,
PSM is not the appropriate technique to estimate treatment effects. Such unobservables
might include culture, which may not have been adequately accounted for by religion and
caste. Positive treatment effects from an alternative method would suggest that
unconfoundedness may not be a major problem with the PSM estimates. Since children
find it hard to recover from growth failure suffered before the age of three (Alderman et al.,
2006a), so I used exposure to ICDS before the age of three to generate a natural control
group and estimated the effect of ICDS on the HAZ scores of children younger than three.
The independent variables in this analysis were identical to those used in the PSM analysis.
Dummy variables for caste, religion, and wealth index were included in both. The results
presented in Table 2.8 yield a positive average treatment effect of the ICDS. The magnitude
of the ATT for children younger than three using these two methods is very similar; the
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ATT from the PSM estimation was 0.08 versus 0.06 from this alternative method.
2.5.2 Quality of the Matching
Since ICDS centers are placed to target worst-off areas, malnutrition levels might also be
worse in villages with ICDS. In general we expect matching to reduce the bias from
targeted placement, but the ability to effectively reduce such bias depends on the quality of
the matching. Several studies show that PSM is an efficient econometric technique for
non-experimental estimations of treatment effect. PSM efficiently controls the bias from
matching (Rubin, 1973). Dehejia and Wahba (2002) demonstrate the ability of PSM to
replicate the experimental benchmark when observed treated samples are very different
from control samples. Figure 2.3 presents kernel density plots of weighted propensity scores
for treated and untreated observations used in matching the entire sample. This figure
shows the propensity scores for the two samples closely track each other, representing
goodness of matches. Further, t-tests show matching significantly reduces the bias in
unmatched sample means for most variables. For instance, matching reduces bias from
differences in birth order number by 0.1 percent, but the average treated child is 2.65th in
birth order, and the average untreated child is 2.73th, after reduction in bias. The
economic difference between an average birth order of 2.65 and 2.73 is small and unlikely to
meaningfully bias the treatment effects. PSM appears to effectively reduce the bias from
targeted program placement.
2.5.3 Bias from Unobserved Village-level Characteristics
NFHS-1 (1992-93) and NFHS-2 (1998-99) contained detailed information on village
characteristics, including development characteristics, presence of other programs that
might indirectly affect child health, and distance to administrative headquarters. These
variables were not available in NFHS-3 (2005-06) data to protect the identity of the HIV
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tested individuals. The village-level aggregates I generated using NFHS-3 data might not
effectively control for factors like the presence of other programs affecting child health, and
distance to administrative headquarters, leading to omitted variable bias in the PSM
estimates of ICDS impact. To examine whether such unobserved characteristics cause an
(upward) bias in my results, I conducted PSM on older data from NFHS-1 and NFHS-2
but omitting any village-level information not available in NFHS-3. Das Gupta et al.
(2005) report insignificant treatment effects of ICDS using NFHS-1 and NFHS-2 data, so
significant estimates for these waves using the village-level aggregates I employed in my
analysis would suggest that the unobserved village characteristics are indeed contaminating
my ICDS treatment effect estimates. However, even using these aggregates, results
presented in Table 2.3 and 2.4 show insignificant treatment effects for NFHS-1 and
NFHS-2, consistent with previous results in the literature (Das Gupta et al., 2005).
2.6 Conclusion
India’s primary child nutrition intervention, the Integrated Child Development Services,
aims to improve the physical and psychological well being of children under the age of five
using targeted program placement. Previous studies of this program find that the ICDS
has little or no effect and that it does not target the right children– the poorest of the poor
and the very young. Most of this literature does not control for the targeted placement
design of ICDS, which leads to a downward bias in estimates of its effectiveness.
Nonetheless, based on such evidence, (Bank, 2007) recommended an expensive ICDS
redesign project to the Indian government. Hence, this paper reexamines the ICDS using
new data and different econometric techniques.
I analyze the ICDS on several dimensions, including treatment effects for the worst-off
children as well as the entire distribution, and program placement. Results show evidence
of effectiveness for some goals. I find that ICDS shifts out the marginal distributions of
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HAZ scores for the worst-off children. Results also show that ICDS increases HAZ scores
by about six percent. I find that placement does not uniformly target less-developed areas
and that not controlling for skewness can lead to misleading conclusions about program
placement. Finally, evidence suggests voting patterns correlate with national-level budget
allocation, which might hamper the effectiveness of ICDS.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that once a village gets ICDS, the
intervention reduces chronic child malnutrition, but which village receives an ICDS center
continues to be problematic. The government might benefit from improving its targeting of
areas with skewed sex ratios, and focus on socioeconomic factors when determining budget
allocation. Further, since the average treatment effect is greatest for the entire distribution,
the government may consider redoubling its efforts to target moderately or severely stunted
children.
This paper also highlights the importance of computing treatment effects for the most
vulnerable parts of the population, in addition to the mean for the entire population.
Targeted programs are intended to benefit the worst-off, so only looking at the average
effect may mask variations in effectiveness. For instance, I find that ICDS significantly
improves HAZ scores for worst-off children not only when there is a significant treatment
effect for everyone, but more importantly, even in the absence of a significant effect for the
entire population. In addition, this analysis shows that imposing assumptions on the
distribution of the data can lead to misleading policy conclusions. My results suggest that
a form flexible estimation strategy yields useful information on how the implementation of
program centers can diverge from stated policy.
UNICEF (2006) estimates that child malnutrition costs India up to four percent of its
national income. This paper finds ICDS increases average HAZ scores by six percent.
Assuming stunting to be the only form of child malnutrition, ICDS increases Indian GDP
by 0.0024 percent (0.06*0.04=0.0024). Based on the 2007 estimate of Indian GDP, $2.97
trillion, 0.0024 percent equals $7.118 billion. In the absence of the ICDS intervention, the
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Indian GDP in 2007 would have been $7.118 billion lower. Since ICDS costs $1.5 billion per
year, the net return from the ICDS was $5.618 billion or a per capita benefit of $4.89 for a
3.75 fold net return. Thus even in its current form, ICDS generates substantial returns.
As Das Gupta et al. (2005) point out, panel data tracking villages and individuals are
the appropriate way to study the ICDS. Cross-sectional data may introduce selection bias
if placement and treatment effectiveness are based on unobservables. However, such bias
would likely be in the downward direction, meaning that my results would be a lower
bound. Further, the data do not permit me to study the utilization of services provided by
ICDS. Nonetheless, my results suggest ICDS increases HAZ scores particularly among the
worst-off. However, benefits may increase if the program is strengthened to better target
least-developed regions. India’s economic growth has been spectacular, but for the
socio-political stability of the country the Indian government cannot neglect its poor and
its young.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Indian NFHS-3 Data
Mother’s Characteristics Mean Standard Deviation
Age 26.80 5.37
Years of Schooling 3.90 1.60
Age at First Marriage 18.05 3.75
Births in Last Five Years 1.62 0.67
Total Births 2.92 1.83
Primary Education (percent) 15.06
Secondary Education (percent) 38.10
Currently Working (percent) 29.01
Children’s Characteristics Mean Standard Deviation
Age (years) 2.05 1.39
HAZ Scores (standard deviations) -1.71 0.66
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Table 2.2: The Estimated Effect of ICDS on Height-for-Age Z-Scores of All, Moderately, and Severely Stunted Children, With
and Without Matching Using Indian NFHS-3 (2005-06) Data
Entire Distribution Moderately Stunted Severely Stunted
Unmatched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.76 -1.78 -1.74 -2.46 -2.46 -2.46 -3.89 -3.91 -3.89
Controls -1.66 -1.69 -1.61 -2.46 -2.46 -2.47 -3.93 -3.93 -3.94
Difference -0.11 -0.09 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05
(0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.019)∗∗ (0.03) (0.03)∗
Matched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.76 -1.78 -1.74 -2.46 -2.46 -2.46 -3.89 -3.91 -3.89
Controls -1.85 -1.88 -1.82 -2.48 -2.47 -2.49 -3.94 -3.92 -3.97
Difference 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08
(0.03)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01) (0.01)∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.03) (0.04)∗∗∗
Observations All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated 28,935 15,027 13,900 6888 3507 3302 6232 3261 2939
Untreated 8853 4608 4245 1957 992 965 1825 1004 821
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
28
Table 2.3: The Estimated Effect of ICDS on Height-for-Age Z-Scores of All, Moderately, and Severely Stunted Children, With
and Without Matching Using Indian NFHS-1 (1992-93) Data
Entire Distribution Moderately Stunted Severely Stunted
Unmatched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -2.44 -2.23 -2.43 -2.47 -2.48 -2.47 -3.99 -3.89 -4.09
Controls -2.68 -2.59 -2.48 -2.47 -2.45 -2.49 -4.11 -4.11 -4.11
Difference 0.23 0.36 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.02
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)
Matched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -2.45 -2.45 -2.43 -2.47 -2.48 -2.47 -3.99 -3.89 -4.07
Controls -2.49 -2.38 -2.34 -2.48 -2.46 -2.50 -4.05 -4.11 -4.07
Difference 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.00
(0.06) (0.08)∗ (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.07)
Observations All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated 1928 1042 1086 547 278 267 610 272 342
Untreated 1990 1148 1108 600 317 271 8180 425 385
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: The Estimated Effect of ICDS on Height-for-Age Z-Scores of All, Moderately, and Severely Stunted Children, With
and Without Matching Using Indian NFHS-2 (1998-99) Data
Entire Distribution Moderately Stunted Severely Stunted
Unmatched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.72 -1.73 -1.71 -2.46 -2.47 -2.46 -3.99 -3.97 -4.01
Controls -1.77 -1.73 -1.80 -2.45 -2.44 -2.46 -4.00 -3.99 -4.02
Difference -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02)∗ (0.03) (0.04)∗ (0.01) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Matched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.72 -1.73 -1.72 -2.45 -2.46 -2.46 -3.99 -3.98 -4.01
Controls -1.75 -1.73 -1.77 -2.46 -2.43 -2.46 -3.99 -3.98 -4.01
Difference 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated 11,667 6103 5478 2448 1269 1181 2443 1253 1218
Untreated 8720 4608 5478 1909 998 908 1937 1007 935
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: The Estimated Effect of ICDS on Height-for-Age Z-Scores of Children Younger
than Two and Three, With and Without Matching Using Indian NFHS-3 (2005-06) Data
Younger than Two Younger than Three
Unmatched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.61 -1.66 -1.55 -1.72 -1.76 -1.67
Controls -1.49 -1.56 -1.40 -1.61 -1.67 -1.55
Difference -0.12 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12
(0.03)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
Matched All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated -1.61 -1.66 -1.55 -1.72 -1.76 -1.67
Controls -1.67 -1.76 -1.58 -1.78 -1.84 -1.74
Difference 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.03)∗ (0.05)∗ (0.05) (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗ (0.044)
Observations All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated 17,096 8847 8245 23,085 11,951 11,135
Untreated 5121 2632 2489 7014 3634 3380
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: Village Participation in ICDS: State- and District-level Regressions Using Indian
NFHS-3 (2005-06) Data
Probit I Probit II Beta Regression
Village Population 0.021∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(2.22) (3.85) (-6.14)
Village Population Squared -0.006∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(-2.71) (-3.65) (3.87)
District Sex Ratio 0.105 0.029 0.120
(0.64) (0.17) (1.35)
Average Wealth -0.334∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(-5.96) (-4.56) (-6.26)
Gini Coefficient 5.038∗∗∗ -137.1∗∗ 9.505∗∗∗
(7.52) (-2.99) (29.30)
Average Land Holding (acres) 0.044 -0.026 -0.047
(0.44) (-0.22) (-0.86)
Average Irrigated Land Holding (acres) 0.007 -0.059 0.267∗∗∗
(0.09) (-0.57) (6.14)
Mothers with Primary Education 0.428∗ 0.513∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(2.34) (2.48) (3.46)
Mothers with Secondary Education 0.737∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(6.06) (3.41) (9.02)
Electrification 0.350∗∗ 0.237 0.282∗∗∗
(2.85) (1.58) (5.03)
Rural Dummy 1.070∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ -0.0177
(15.37) (15.31) (-0.46)
Highly Prevalent Riskywater Access -0.103 -0.273∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(-1.23) (-2.84) (5.49)
Constant -2.545∗∗∗ 49.79∗∗ -3.444∗∗∗
(-8.32) (3.00) (-23.40)
Akaike Information Criterion 2936.45 2674.43 -2169.49
Observations 3288 3239 3240
t-statistic in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: Results from a State-level Regression of Federal Allocation of ICDS
Administrative Budget
LN(ICDS Admin Budget)
Wealth -2.143∗∗
(-2.50)
Gini Coefficient -1.214
(-0.54)
Vote -0.00534
(-0.80)
Wealth*Vote 0.0456 ∗
(2.18)
State Population 3.39e-08∗∗∗
(4.60)
State Population Squared -1.12e-16∗
(-2.26)
LN(HAZ Score) -0.112
(-0.05)
LN(Mothers with Secondary Education) 1.117∗∗
(2.59)
LN(Mothers with Primary Education) 1.257∗∗
(2.80)
LN(Rural) 0.460
(1.73)
LN(Sex Ratio) -2.591
(-1.05)
Constant 29.85
(1.60)
Observations 29
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.8: ICDS Impact on HAZ-Scores of Children Under Age 3: NFHS-3 Data
Exposed to ICDS Before Age Three
Exposed to ICDS Before Age Three 0.059∗∗
(2.90)
Current Age of Child -0.244∗∗∗
(-40.29)
Sex of Child 0.046∗∗
(2.75)
Birth Order -0.074∗∗∗
(-11.09)
Mother’s Current Age 0.024∗∗∗
(10.95)
Mother Not Educated -0.518∗∗∗
(-12.39)
Mother Has Primary Educ. -0.439∗∗∗
(-9.84)
Mother Has Secondary Educ. -0.346∗∗∗
(-9.08)
Hindu 0.144
(1.77)
Muslim 0.177∗
(2.13)
Christian 0.191∗
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.8 – Continued
Exposed to ICDS Before Age Three
(2.28)
Sikh 0.336∗∗∗
(3.33)
Poorest Quintile -0.735∗∗∗
(-16.86)
Poorer Quintile -0.602∗∗∗
(-15.41)
Middle Quintile -0.494∗∗∗
(-14.31)
Richer Quintile -0.326∗∗∗
(-10.98)
District Population -0.017∗∗∗
(-5.91)
District Pop. Sq. 0.000∗∗∗
(3.39)
District Sex Ratio 0.055
(0.89)
Mothers with Primary Educ. 0.070
(1.08)
Mothers with Secondary Educ. 0.129∗∗
(2.83)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.8 – Continued
Exposed to ICDS Before Age Three
Average Wealth -0.027
(-1.22)
Average Land Holding (acres) -0.0001∗
(-2.32)
Average Irrigated Land Holding (acres) 0.000
(1.32)
Riskywater Access 0.121∗∗∗
(5.05)
Unimproved Sanitation -0.118∗∗∗
(-3.94)
Electrification 0.040
(1.70)
Gini Coefficient 0.346
(1.79)
Constant -0.936∗∗∗
(-5.85)
Observations 37790
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Estimates of Height-for-Age Z-Scores by ICDS Coverage and Wealth Index Quintiles: Indian
NFHS-3 (2005-06) Data
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of State-wise ICDS Coverage: Indian NFHS-3 (2005-6) Data
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Figure 2.3: Propensity Scores by ICDS Coverage: Indian NFHS-3 (2005-6) Data
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CHAPTER 3
EMPOWERING WOMEN THROUGH EDUCATION
AND INFLUENCE: AN EVALUATION OF THE
INDIAN MAHILA SAMAKHYA PROGRAM
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Gender empowerment allows women to make the most of their human capital.
Empowerment allows individuals to reach their full potential, to improve their political and
social participation, and to believe in their own capabilities. Empowerment also has
important ramifications for the rest of the household: empowered women have fewer
children and higher child survival rates (Dyson and Moore, 1983), healthier and better-fed
children (Quisumbing and de la Brie`re, 2000), and a generally greater allocation of
resources to children (Thomas, 1990). Development programs have aimed to empower
women by increasing their control over contraceptive choices, by providing them credit,
and through education; however, many alternative mechanisms can empower women,
including working with the community to change social norms.
In this paper, I use primary data from rural north India to examine the impact of an
Indian women’s empowerment program named Mahila Samakhya on female empowerment
outcomes. Mahila Samakhya is a unique and innovative way to improve female
empowerment. Women’s empowerment is particularly hard to change within a generation
because it is affected by strict social norms. While a number of programs aim to improve
female empowerment through education, the Mahila Samakhya program in India combines
providing education with support groups, and has the explicit objective of increasing
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gender empowerment. The program attempts to empower women through education and
organization into support groups. Education provided by the program improves job
prospects and increases the reservation wage, and can thus help empower women to control
a greater share of the household’s resources and become more active participants in their
communities. Further, information and social spillovers might empower participants who
do not work, and thus do not benefit from the employment aspect of Mahila Samakhya. So,
even unemployed participants may be empowered by Mahila Samakhya. This program is
fairly unique, but has the potential to be replicated elsewhere in the developing world
because it attempts to harness local peer networks to change social norms and empower
women. As a result, this evaluation may provide valuable evidence on the effectiveness of
community-level interventions in changing ingrained social patterns.
In establishing whether Mahila Samakhya has a significant impact of female
empowerment, I need to account for two potential sources of endogeneity: program
placement and self-selection of participants. As a result, I conduct my analysis in two
stages: first, I use Propensity Score Matching to examine whether non-participants in
treated and untreated are significantly different from each other. This step allows me to
test whether the program is targeted in placement. If the program were in fact targeted to
communities with lower initial bargaining power, treatment effect estimates that did not
control for placement would be lower than the actual impact. However, if I find that
non-participants in treated and untreated districts are not significantly different from each
other, I can conclude the program is not targeted towards areas of most need. Next, I test
whether participants are significantly more empowered than women from untreated
districts to determine whether the program has a significant treatment effect. Finally, I
focus on the empowerment outcomes of participants who do not work, comparing them to
untreated women who also do not work. I find that even those participants who do no
benefit from the enhanced employability effect of participation are significantly more
empowered than untreated women.
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Results show that non-participants in treated and untreated districts have similar
empowerment outcomes. Hence, I conclude that the program does not target its placement
at districts that represent particular segments of the population. My results also show that
the program has a significant, positive treatment effect on female empowerment:
participants are more likely to have access to outside employment, leave the house without
permission, and participate in village council meetings. Village-level political participation
and increased earnings are associated with greater control over household assets and greater
say in the household. I also find a spillover effect that works independently of employment:
participants who do not work are nonetheless more likely to report having access to outside
employment and to leave the house without permission. My results thus establish that
participation in the Mahila Samakhya program increases female empowerment.
3.2 Background on Uttarakhand and Mahila Samakhya
Uttarakhand is a rural state in the Indian Himalayas. The state is small and rural,
comprising less than one percent of the Indian population. Only five cities contain more
than 100,000 people. On the surface, Uttarakhandi women may appear to be more
empowered than the average. Women led the Chipko movement1 as well as the demand for
a separate state. However, looking beneath the surface reveals a different story. Although
the state has a literacy rate of 72 percent, the Census reports only 60 percent of all women
are literate. A more detailed measure of literacy from a nationally representation
household survey finds 43 percent of Uttarakhandi women cannot read at all, while an
additional 5 percent can only read parts of a sentence (IIPS and Macro, 2007). Therefore,
the effective literacy rate for females may be closer to 50 percent.
Although 46 percent of all Uttarakhandi women work, 64 percent of these women were
not paid for their work, and over 70 percent worked in agriculture. These women likely
1The Hindi word Chipko means to stick. In the Chipko movement of the seventies, Uttarakhandi villagers,
and women in particular, literally hugged trees to prevent deforestation.
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work on their family’s farmland, which does little to empower them. As well, 23 percent of
Uttarakhandi women have no say over how their household spends money, and almost 43
percent do not have the final say on their own healthcare. Over half (55 percent) did not
have the final say on large purchases made by their household (IIPS and Macro, 2007).
Hence, Uttarakhandi women can lead very restricted lives with little say in the household
or community.
In 1988, Mahila Samakhya was launched in three states of India to empower women
through formal, informal, and vocational education. In theory, the community-level
program was placed in districts identified by (1) low rates of female education, (2) low
school attendance by girls, (3) remoteness, and (4) lack of development and restricted
access to infrastructure. In practice, as my results will highlight, the program does not
appear to be targeted. Participation in the program is voluntary, and no monetary
incentives are offered.2 The program entered Uttarakhand in 1995 and covers 2,416 villages
in six of thirteen of Uttarakhandi districts. More than 42,000 women participate in this
program, and over 2500 girls have been educated in its centers.
Mahila Samakhya conducts literacy camps and provides continuing education to women
and girls. The program provides vocational training to enable participants to earn an
income. Participants have used the training to become midwives, herbal medicine
manufacturers, bakers, grocers, candle makers, and tailors. Such training improves the
participant’s employability, giving her access to outside employment, and hence improving
her level of empowerment in the household and the community. In addition, the program
provides special education on resolving domestic disputes, and conflicts within the
community. The program also encourages women to participate in village politics as a
means of self-empowerment. Participants hear about the success women have had in the
labor force, and the important roles women can play in Indian society. They are also told
about the benefits of having a daughter and of not discriminating against her. Groups of
2When participants travel to district-meetings, they are housed and fed at the program headquarters,
and their travel expenses are reimbursed.
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participants support each other on issues like domestic violence, alcoholism, dowry, and
female infanticide. These secondary interventions have the potential to generate significant
spillover effects wherein even participants who do not work, and therefore do not benefit
from improved employability, can be significantly more empowered than those who do not
participate in the program.
Mahila Samakhya enters a village through program workers called sahayoginis. The
worker first conducts several rounds of talks with local women to determine what their
needs are, and what they would like from the program. This process can take up to several
weeks, but as a result, the program’s activities are tailored to each village. The program
often starts with literacy or education camps because these are the most frequently-voiced
concerns. Initially only a few women may participate, but as others see the benefits of
participation, they muster up the courage to participate despite family opposition.
The program can meet with resistance from the men in the village, who may see the
program as subversive and be unwilling to let their wives participate. In such cases,
workers stress the educational rather than empowerment component of the the
intervention. Once the men observe the benefits of participation, generally in the form of
earnings, they reduce their opposition. Sometimes, as the women become more mobile,
men might again oppose participation, but usually the women are sufficiently empowered
at this point that the opposition no longer restricts their involvement.
The program is funded by the Indian government and the British Department for
International Development. Annual national and state reviews of the program use
summary statistics to evaluate its effectiveness in increasing female empowerment, as
measured by educational attainment, the regularity of village- and district-level group
meetings, and political participation in the village council. Reviews also use information
from focus groups to gauge whether the program has raised the level of confidence and the
sense of community in participants.
Participation in the program increases the woman’s educational attainment, which is an
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endogenous individual characteristic. Providing a woman with education improves her job
prospects (Phipps and Burton, 1998). When bargaining with her husband over household
resources, knowing about better job opportunities and having more marketable skills
increase her disagreement utility.3 The education gained through this program is therefore
expected to raise bargaining power.
3.3 Literature Review
The literature on female autonomy empowerment largely follows two approaches. The first
set of studies considers the the determinants of female empowerment. The second set of
studies examines different proxies for female empowerment. The only other evaluation of
the Mahila Samakhya intervention; Janssens (2010) focuses on the social capital building
aspects of the program rather than its direct impact on female empowerment.
Female autonomy or empowerment is measured by a woman’s relative ability to make
household decisions, compared to the husband. Since this ability cannot be explicitly
measured, economists study whether variables such as education, contraceptive use, and
asset-ownership are correlated with high female empowerment. These self-reported
variables reflect the wide variety of choices and decisions at stake in the household bargain:
employment, fertility, and resource allocation. Scholars tend to agree that a woman’s
autonomy depends on economic factors, demographic characteristics, culture, and political
participation (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Beegle et al., 2001;
Hashemi et al., 1996).
A large body of literature finds that a woman’s access to employment outside the house
increases her household bargaining power (Rahman and Rao, 2004; Anderson and Eswaran,
2009). The ownership of assets, in particular, is one important way through which access
3The disagreement utility is simply each spouse’s intertemporal utility if they remained single or if they
were non-cooperating in marriage, and depends on the spouse’s own earning potential and the partner’s
earning potential as well as on the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome of investment in children (Mas Colell
et al., 1995, p. 839).
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to employment helps empower women in developing countries (Agarwal, 2001). In
addition, several analyses have found that access to credit programs— whether through
micro-finance organizations or rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA)— has a
positive effect on female empowerment (Hashemi et al., 1996; Anderson and Baland, 2002).
Studies have also found a positive link between empowerment and contraceptive
use (Schuler and Hashemi, 1994), as well as between the woman’s influence on resource
allocation and her family’s social status (Quisumbing and de la Brie`re, 2000). In
particular, the more educated she and her father are relative to her husband, the more
empowered she is as well. Relative physical mobility is another important determinant of
autonomy (Hashemi et al., 1996) since it reflects the woman’s access to outside
employment opportunities. Another study of the determinants of female autonomy in India
finds that a better-educated mother has greater bargaining power through the channel of
increased information (Rahman and Rao, 2004). The same study also finds culture, as
measured by state fixed-effects, to be significant despite several variables like religion, and
caste, that attempt to control for regional differences. Further evidence from India shows
strong positive correlations between female education as a proxy for bargaining power, and
freedom of movement and better maternal health as bargaining outcomes (Malhotra et al.,
2003).
The literature further agrees that the clearing of marriage markets depends on the
number of men and women in the market (Becker, 1973a,b; Neelakantan and Tertilt, 2008).
As a result, the local sex ratio works through the spousal age ratio to influence marriage
markets and therefore household bargaining power. Scholars have found that, particularly
in the Indian context, women have less bargaining power if their husbands are significantly
older (Caldwell et al., 1983; Kantor, 2003). Since Mahila Samakhya targets married
women, and none of the women in my sample participated in the program before marriage,
the spousal age gap is not affected by program participation. In Uttarakhand, in
particular, program officials of the Mahila Samakhya intervention told us that women
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married to much older men have little say in the household, because often the age gap
arises from a second marriage for the man, or some “undesirable” quality in the woman or
her background. Hence, I treat a woman’s spousal age gap as a proxy for her
pre-participation level of empowerment.
Since empowerment is an unobservable latent variable, economists use its observable
characteristics as proxies for empowerment. Women with high values of the proxies, such
as a greater spousal age ratio, access to outside employment or a high level of political
participation, likely also have greater bargaining power. Thus, among the indicators of a
high level of empowerment are (1) access to outside employment, (2) physical mobility, and
(3) political participation (Hashemi et al., 1996; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Anderson and
Eswaran, 2009). As a result, the dependent variables I use to reflect high levels of female
autonomy are (1) the ownership of identification cards for the national government’s rural
employment guarantee scheme, (2) the ability to leave the household without permission,
and (3) participation in weekly village council meetings. I choose these variables because
they represent a diverse set of ways in which the Mahila Samakhya program can
potentially empower women.
With the exception of analyses of credit extension mechanisms, the studies discussed
above focus on interventions targeted at the individual. Only a small number of papers
look at community-level interventions. For instance, Imai and Eklund (2008) uses survey
data on women’s community-based organization in rural Papua New Guinea to assess the
effectiveness of autonomous women’s groups compared to women’s groups those that
receive external support. Their results— using a Heckman Selection Model as well as
Propensity Score Matching— show that the autonomous groups are more effective in
improving child welfare.
The only formal econometric evaluation of Mahila Samakhya uses data from the state of
Bihar, but does not estimate the effect on women’s empowerment (the programs intended
goal), but on the spillover effect on trust and social capital (Janssens, 2010). The paper
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uses Propensity Score Matching to calculate Intent-to-Treat estimates of the program.
Matching women from treated villages to those from untreated villages, results suggest
that the program significantly increases trust and engenders social capital. Participants are
more likely to contribute to local educational and infrastructural community projects.
Significant spillovers also exist with non-participants: non-participant households in
program villages exhibit higher levels of trust and are more likely to engage in community
building activities than households in non-program villages.
3.4 Data
I use primary data that I collected from the Indian state of Uttarakhand (the cross-hatched
region in Figure 3.1) on participation in Mahila Samakhya, measures of female
empowerment, child welfare, and social networks. My survey area covers six Uttarakhand
districts, four with the program and two without. (The survey districts are represented in
the inset of Figure 3.1 with a dotted pattern. The four districts with a thick border and
dotted patterns are program districts. The two dotted districts without a thick border are
non-program districts.) Villages within the sample were randomly-chosen. The sample size
is 487 women. The survey was designed to trace self-reported networks, and hence was
implemented using restricted snowball sampling. In each village, I interviewed a
randomly-chosen woman and asked her to list her five closest friends. I then conducted
follow-up interviews with two randomly-selected women from these five friends. I asked
each of these two follow-up interviewees about five of their closest friends, and interviewed
two friends each. Thus, starting with one woman, my sampling strategy gave me a network
of seven. My survey instrument includes the following key questions which will help me
identify the effect of participation in the Mahila Samakhya intervention on an individual’s
level of empowerment:
• Female Empowerment Dependent Variables:
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– Whether the respondent has an identification card for the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).4
– Whether the woman can leave the house without permission.5
– Whether the woman participates in the local village council.
– The woman’s age relative to that of her husband.
– Does the woman work outside the house?
• Participation:
– Whether the woman participates in the Mahila Samakhya intervention.
– How long she has been a member of the program.
• Other Socioeconomic Characteristics
– The number of children born to the woman and their ages. The number of boys
and girls.
– How much the woman cares about her friends’ opinion. How much her husband
cares about the villagers’ opinions of him.
– The number of rooms in the house and the primary source of lighting.
I distinguish between pre-determined empowerment characteristics, like the spousal age
ratio, and characteristics that might be affected by participation, such as owning of the
4NREGS guarantees at least a hundred days of paid work to the rural poor. Having an identification card
gives the women access to outside employment. Program supervisors sometimes deny women these cards
because the work generated by NREGS is of a manual nature, and is thus considered ”unsuitable” for a
woman. Mahila Samakhya officers encourage participants to demand the cards, and where necessary report
the supervisor to the local administrative officer.
5Since this variable is difficult to verify, it might suffer from reporting bias: participants know the “correct
answer” to this question is that do not need permission to leave the house, and thus might be systematically
more likely to overstate their physical mobility than non-participants. However, in field tests, we observed
that participants were significantly more sensitive to their lack of household bargaining power and were likely
to underreport the amount of say they had in the household because the program had made them aware of
the entire feasible set of outcomes for women. Therefore, if we were to expect a sizable reporting bias by
participants, it would be in the downward direction, i.e. participants would be likely to underreport their
their physical mobility.
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NREGS identification card or participation in village council meetings. As discussed above,
the spousal age ratio is pre-determined because none of the women in my sample (and in
general) participated in the program before marriage. I cannot rule out the possibility that
an older relative of the woman, say her mother, is a Mahila Samakhya participant and that
therefore the respondent’s age at marriage was not completely unaffected by participation.
However, program participants tend to be young women, and the program only came into
the region in 1995, so the influence of the participation of an older relative on a later
participant’s marriage decision is likely to be minimal. The difference between matched
pre-determined empowerment characteristics of participants and untreated women thus
provides a baseline level of empowerment for participants.
3.4.1 Summary statistics
As Table 3.1 shows, the average woman in my sample is 32 years old, while her husband is
38 years old. She married at age 19, has 9 years of education, while her husband has an
additional year of education. The average age of her sons is eight years, while that of her
daughters is six years. Sons and daughters have, on average, equal amounts of education;
about seven years. The average woman’s house has three rooms and electricity.
Table 3.2 indicates that participants are significantly more empowered than
non-participants. While on average, 60.62 percent of the women in my sample said they
had NREGS cards, only 48.94 percent of non-participants did. In contrast, over 68 percent
of participants had these cards. Similarly, while 70.89 percent of the sample said they did
not need permission to leave the house. Only 58.82 percent of non-participants but 78.17
percent of participants did not need permission. Finally, while only 14.20 percent of
non-participants reported attending village council meetings, almost half of all participants
did. In summary, whether in the form of access to employment, physical mobility, or
political participation, women who participate in Mahila Samakhya have higher levels of
empowerment. Of course, these statistics do not tell us whether more empowered women
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are simply targeted by or self-select into the program, or whether participation actually
improves female autonomy.
Table 3.3 indicates the presence of self-selection into Mahila Samakhya. The average
participant is three percentage points closer in age to her husband than the average
non-participant in treated districts, which suggests that women with greater initial
bargaining power may self-select into the program. Further, participants tend to have older
and more sons than non-participants, although the differences are not quite significant.
Participants are less likely to live with their husbands; the difference of 19 percent is highly
significant. Participants are also close-to-significantly less likely to live with their
parents-in-law. And finally, participants are significantly more likely to be Brahmin than
non-participants.
Several other characteristics, such as the number and age of daughters, the spousal
education ratio, and the woman’s time to collect water, are statistically equal for
participants and non-participants. Further, none of the wealth indicators, including
number of rooms, electrification, improved toilet facilities, materials used in floor and wall
construction, are different for these two groups, suggesting that poorer participants neither
select into the program nor are they targeted based on indicators of wealth (number of
rooms, electrification, access to improved toilet facilities, and nature of the construction
materials used for the floor and walls of the house). Nonetheless, this table highlights the
importance of controlling for selection in to the Mahila Samakhya program.
Table 3.4 shows us key characteristics of the four treated and two untreated districts in
the sample. This table shows that the program does not appear to be targeted in
placement because there are few significant differences between the average characteristics
between treated and untreated districts. The only significant difference is in the number of
sons; on average, participants have 0.27 sons more than non-participants. The magnitude
of the difference suggests the economic impact, if any, is small. Thus, treated districts
appear very much like untreated districts; the program does not appear to be targeting
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districts with particular characteristics.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Methodology
I estimate two sets of treatment effects. The first examines whether non-participants in
treated and untreated districts are significantly different in terms of female empowerment
outcomes. The second estimates the impact of the program on participants relative to
non-participants with similar characteristics in untreated districts to account for any issues
of self-selection. Although table 3.4 indicates the lack of any substantial differences
between treated and untreated districts, the first treatment effect more formally tests this
assumption.
To account for potential targeted placement of or self-selection into the Mahila
Samakhya program, I use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) on my data. When treatment
assignment or participation is not random but determined by observables, PSM allows us
to compare treated individuals to untreated individuals (or non-participants in treated and
untreated districts) using observables such as demographic and economic characteristics to
construct the control group. Each individual in the dataset is assigned a propensity score
that tells us the likelihood of an individual being treated. That propensity score is a
conditional probability measure of treatment participation, given observable
characteristics, x, and is expressed as follows:
Pi(x) = P [Di = 1|X = x], (3.1)
given that the balancing condition is satisfied (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Treated and
untreated individuals are matched based on proximity of their propensity scores, thus
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creating the control group. I can then estimate treatment effects by comparing the
outcome of interest for the treated and control groups. PSM eliminates selection bias if
controlling for x eliminates selection bias from endogenous placement. Since treated and
untreated districts are not significantly different, treatment assignment appears to be
random, assuming unobservables are distributed as observables are.
For the treatment effect comparing untreated individuals, each non-participant in
treated districts is matched with replacement with one from districts without Mahila
Samakhya based on the closeness of the propensity score. For the treatment effect
comparing participants to untreated individuals, each participant is matched with
replacement with an individual from an untreated district. I use kernel matching in which
all treated observations are matched with a weighted average of the propensity score for all
control observations. Weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the
propensity scores of treated and control observations (Becker and Ichino, 2002).
I conduct this matching in Stata using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003), based on
observed factors that likely affect both program participation and female empowerment:
(1) spousal age ratio, (2) age at marriage, (3) her years of education, whether she literate,
and whether she has less than four years of education (and is thus likely to need the
education provided by the program), (4) how much she cares about her friends’ opinion of
her (reflecting her interest in community-level interventions such as Mahila Samakhya), (5)
how much her husband cares about villagers’ opinion of him (reflecting how binding social
norms are on the household), (6) the number and age of children, (7) whether the
respondent lives with in-laws and sisters-in-law, (8) whether she is a Brahmin, (9) the
number of rooms in her house, and (10) whether her house has electricity. Village fixed
effects are also included. I tried various specifications as well as matching metrics for the
matching process; results are robust.
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3.5.2 Results
Table 3.5 presents the two sets of treatment effects discussed above: the first comparing
non-participants from treated and untreated districts, and the other comparing
participants to women with similar characteristics from untreated districts. The upper
panel of the table shows the results comparing non-participants. These results tell us that
a non-participant is not significantly more empowered by simply living in a treated district.
Empowerment is measured in two ways: (1) the pre-determined spousal age ratio which
cannot be affected by Mahila Samkhya, and (2) characteristics that can be affected by
participation, like having an NREGS identification card, leaving the house without
permission, and attending village council meetings. Without matching, only the NREGS
cards variable is significantly different, with non-participants being significantly more likely
to own NREGS cards. After matching, the lack of significant differences tell us that, once
matched, non-participants and untreated women have similar levels of base empowerment,
suggesting that self-selection into the program might not be a very large concern. The
decrease in significance in NREGS card ownership highlights the importance of controlling
for selection in to the program. Indeed, given that treated and untreated districts are very
similar, these estimates tell us Mahila Samakhya does not target districts with particularly
low (or high) levels of empowerment.
The lower panel of table 3.5 presents treatment effects of the program on participants.
These results show that participants and untreated women have statistically equal spousal
age ratios, suggesting that individuals do not choose to participate based on initial
bargaining power. Hence, any differences in the other measures of empowerment likely
stem from the effect of the program. Evidence suggests that the program significantly
increases access to outside employment, as 81 percent of participants own NREGS
identification cards, compared to only 14.5 percent of untreated, which translates to a
difference of 66.4 percentage points. Similarly, while 51 percent of all participants are likely
to attend village council meetings, only 20.6 percents of the untreated do so. Participants
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are also significantly more likely to leave the house without permission, although the
significance of this difference is much lower than the rest. A woman’s ability to leave the
house without permission depends on a high stakes bargain with her husband and in-laws,
rather than on a much lower stakes conversation with “outsiders” like the NREGS
supervisor. As a result, this ability may depend not only on program participation but also
on the behavior of her peers and support from them; this link is studied in greater detail in
the following chapter of this dissertation.
Table 3.5 also shows that program participation increases the likelihood of a woman
working, compared to untreated women; however, the associated t-statistic is 1.53, making
this difference a little short of statistically significant at the ten percent level. In addition
to an effect of the program on empowerment through increased employability, there may
also be a sizable spillover effect even on participants who do not work.
Table 3.6 presents treatment effects of the program on these women by matching them
to the untreated. These results suggest the presence of a significant spillover effect:
participants who do not work are still more likely to have an NREGS card and to leave the
house without permission. They are not, however, more likely to participate in village
council meetings. The fact that non-working women still own NREGS cards maybe because
NREGS only generates a hundred days of employment; hence participants may not have
been working at the time of the interview, but still had access to the NREGS program. In
summary, the Mahila Samakhya program empowers women through employability and
spillovers, even though it does not appear target the intervention at women of most need.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper uses primary data from the rural north Indian state of Uttarakhand to study
the impact of the Mahila Samakhya program on women’s empowerment. Mahila Samakhya
aims to empower women, especially through education, and takes a grassroots approach to
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its implementation. Uttarakhand is a remote and rural state in northern India, and
women, in particular, lead disempowered and oppressed lives. Mahila Samakhya aims to
empower women through education and information. I find that the program has resulted
in significant increases in access to outside employment, the woman’s ability to leave home
without permission, and political participation, all of which are associated with higher
levels of female bargaining power. I also find that participants who do not work are still
more able to leave the house without permission and have access to outside employment.
Thus, evidence presented in this paper shows that Mahila Samakhya succeeds in
empowering women.
These results should be interpreted with some caution if selection on unobservables is a
serious concern. Further, the Mahila Samakhya intervention adopts a slow and careful
approach to rolling out its activities. These results can thus not be generalized to programs
following a faster, more individual-focused, or a traditional top-down approach. Ideally, I
would have panel data that would let me better understand the dynamics of the observed
treatment effect. Any bias from program placement would, if anything, tend to result in
underestimated outcomes because the program would target women with low levels of
empowerment. Thus, the treated would, by design, have worse empowerment outcomes
than the untreated, leading to the results being lower bounds on the true treatment effect.
Nonetheless, my results show that a community-based intervention such as Mahila
Samakhya can significantly improve female empowerment, both through improved
employability as well as significant spillovers. More empowered women invest more in their
children, and as a result have healthier and better-fed children. Hence, the success of this
program has encouraging implications not just for female empowerment goals, but also for
the other factors affected by empowerment, such as child welfare goals.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Uttarakhand, India
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics Using a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India,
2009-2010
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Respondent’s Age 472 32.18 8.11 20 65
Husband’s Age 437 37.89 9.25 23 80
Respondent’s Age at Marriage 463 19.25 3.34 1 30
Average age of sons 487 8.05 7.79 0 36
Average age of daughters 487 6.18 6.70 0 30
Respondent’s Years of Education 397 8.82 4.06 0 17
Husband’s Years of Education 414 10.13 3.68 1 17
Sons’ Years of Education 443 7.04 4.34 1 17
Daughters’ Years of Education 355 6.73 4.23 1 17
Number of Rooms 487 3.33 2.12 0 19
Electrification 487 0.89 0.31 0 1
Table 3.2: Female Bargaining Power: Dependent Variables from a Women’s Empowerment
Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Dependent Variables Percent Yes
Has NREGS ID Card
All 60.62
Non-participants 48.94
Participants 68.02
Can Leave House Without Permission
All 70.89
Non-participants 58.82
Participants 78.17
Participates in Village Council Meetings
All 36.36
Non-participants 14.20
Participants 49.49
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Table 3.3: Basic Characteristics of Participants and Non-participants in Districts with
Mahila Samakhya Using a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Variables Non-participants Participants Difference t-test
Demographics
Own-to-husband’s age 0.84 0.86 -0.03 -2.53∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Age at Marriage 18.48 19.17 -0.69 1.63
(0.38) (0.21) (0.42)
Age of Sons 7.26 8.97 -1.71 -1.81
(0.77) (0.50) (0.95)
Age of Daughters 6.33 6.54 -0.21 -0.25
(0.73) (0.44) (0.84)
Number of Sons 1.16 1.37 -0.21 -1.87
(0.09) (0.06) (0.11)
Number of Daughters 0.98 1.14 -0.16 -1.31
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)
Own-to-husband’s education 0.66 0.58 0.07 1.38
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Low Education 0.29 0.31 -0.14 -0.26
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Respondent Lives with Husband 0.85 0.67 0.19 3.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Respondent Lives with In-laws 0.55 0.44 0.12 1.90
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Respondent Works 0.52 0.59 -0.06 -1.02
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Brahmin 0.06 0.20 -0.14 -3.18∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Time to water source 25.65 24.09 1.55 0.24
(3.77) (3.19) (6.38)
Wealth Indicators
Number of Rooms 3.09 3.30 -0.21 -0.81
(0.21) (0.13) (0.26)
Electrification (No=0; Yes=1) 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Improved Toilet (No=0; Yes=1) 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.35
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Floor† 1.63 1.86 -0.23 -1.71
(0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Walls† 1.77 1.81 -0.03 -0.25
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
†Impermeable=1; semi-permeable=2; permeable=3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Basic Characteristics of Treated and Untreated Districts Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Variables Untreated Treated Difference t-test
Demographics
Own-to-husband’s age 0.85 0.85 -0.03 -0.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age at Marriage 19.76 18.69 1.08 1.33
(0.05) (0.54) (0.81)
Age of Sons 6.96 9.03 -2.07 -1.66
(0.84) (0.76) (1.25)
Age of Daughters 5.45 6.98 -1.52 -1.78
(0.46) (0.84) (1.29)
Number of Sons 1.09 1.38 -0.29 -2.27∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.13)
Number of Daughters 0.99 1.13 -0.14 -1.29
(0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
Own-to-husband’s education 0.65 0.61 0.03 0.35
(0.12) (0.04) (0.09)
Respondent Lives with Husband 0.83 0.76 0.07 0.42
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Respondent Lives with In-laws 0.56 0.45 0.11 1.18
(0.11) (0.04) (0.09)
Respondent Works 0.45 0.65 -0.08 -1.11
(0.07) (0.12) (0.18)
Brahmin 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.45
(0.21) (0.06) (0.16)
Time to water source 23.51 24.14 -0.63 -0.11
(3.43) (3.18) (5.63)
Wealth Indicators
Number of Rooms 3.58 3.07 0.51 0.96
(0.49) (0.29) (0.53)
Electrification (No=0; Yes=1) 0.90 0.88 0.02 0.21
(0.004) (0.05) (0.08)
Improved Toilet (No=0; Yes=1) 0.18 0.21 0.04 -0.30
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Floor† 1.41 1.55 -0.14 -0.43
(0.41) (0.14) (0.33)
Walls† 1.39 1.76 -0.37 -1.85
(0.18) (0.11) (0.19)
†Impermeable=1; semi-permeable=2; permeable=3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.5: The Estimated Effect of Mahila Samakhya Participation on Measures of Female
Empowerment Using a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Non-Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.835 0.719 0.671 0.152 0.641
Untreated 0.849 0.256 0.578 0.0986 0.523
Difference -0.015 0.463 0.093 0.053 0.118
(0.014) (0.071)∗∗∗ (0.081) (0.055) (0.097)
Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.835 0.719 0.671 0.152 0.641
Untreated 0.839 0.634 0.747 0.089 0.297
Difference -0.004 0.085 -0.076 0.063 0.344
(0.033) (0.213) (0.221) (0.148) (0.031)
Observations 160 160 143 150 108
Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.862 0.808 0.793 0.505 0.613
Untreated 0.849 0.183 0.644 0.212 0.425
Difference 0.0119 0.625 0.149 0.292 0.188
(0.009) (0.045)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗
Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.862 0.808 0.793 0.505 0.613
Untreated 0.843 0.145 0.493 0.206 0.241
Difference 0.019 0.664 0.299 0.299 0.372
(0.024) (0.118)∗∗∗ (0.149)∗ (0.129)∗∗ (0.243)
Observations 336 334 308 327 271
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: The Estimated Effect of Mahila Samakhya Participation on Measures of Female
Empowerment of Women Who Do Not Work Using a Women’s Empowerment Study,
Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Has NREGS Can Go Out Council
Card W/o Permission Meetings
Participants 0.727 0.663 0.421
Untreated 0.182 0.702 0.321
Difference 0.545 -0.039 0.099
(0.073)∗∗∗ (0.086) (0.085)
Matched Has NREGS Can Go Out Council
Card W/o Permission Meetings
Participants 0.727 0.663 0.421
Untreated 0.136 0.337 0.205
Difference 0.591 0.325 0.216
(0.158)∗∗∗ (0.195)∗ (0.175)
Observations 143 130 130
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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CHAPTER 4
STANDING TOGETHER: PEER NETWORKS,
FEMALE EMPOWERMENT, AND CHILD
WELFARE
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
Almost a third of all children in developing countries are malnourished (Smith and
Haddad, 2000). One way to improve child welfare is to empower women; evidence suggests
mothers invest more than fathers in their children, hence women who can influence their
household’s resource allocation have healthier children than those who cannot (Maitra,
2004; Thomas et al., 2002; Quisumbing and de la Brie`re, 2000). In this paper, I quantify
the impact of network-based learning and influence on measures of female empowerment
and child nutrition using primary data from India.
A woman’s ability to influence household resource allocation depends on her notion of
identity and the utility she receives from it,1 her bargaining power, and the social norms,2
as well as the interaction of these three forces. Bargaining power is affected by her identity
and the social norms, which in turn are influenced by local culture (Akerlof and Kranton,
2010). Identity and norms can be a source of strength and confidence (Sen, 2006) but in
the presence of constricting social norms, identity can confine and limit power. In remote
and poor regions, I argue peer networks are an effective way to change social norms,
bargaining power, and hence child nutrition.
1Identity utility is the “gain when actions conform to actions and ideals, and the loss insofar as they do
not”( (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010, p. 18).
2A social norm refers to the behavioral expectations within society or a sub-group of society. Norms
“coordinate people’s expectations in interactions that possess multiple equilibria” (Young, 2008).
63
Individuals learn new information from peers and trust the information because it came
from a friend. They also compare themselves to their friends and define their well-being
relative to their peers. Friends provide information and influence behavior, thus helping
define identity. Peer networks in traditional societies may be homogenous and stratified by
income or social hierarchy, therefore reinforcing social norms. Conservative social norms
will reinforce current bargaining power, which is often skewed to the male in the household.
Strengthening the women within a social network can influence the social norms within
that network to withstand norms; policy-makers can thus harness network-based learning
and influence to improve child welfare.
To study whether peer networks influence bargaining power and therefore child welfare, I
test the following hypotheses:
• Does the bargaining power of a woman’s peers affect her own bargaining power?
• Do social learning and influence cause networks to change a woman’s parenting
behavior?
To answer these questions, I use primary data collected from India. Indian per-capita
income has more than doubled since the mid-nineties. Agricultural production is at an
all-time high, and large buffer stocks of cereals lie in government granaries. Such economic
and agricultural success notwithstanding, over forty percent of all Indian children younger
than five suffer from malnutrition. By contrast, only about thirty percent of sub-Saharan
African children are similarly malnourished (Gragnolati et al., 2005). In addition, social
norms greatly restrict a woman’s say in her household, and she is used to thinking of
herself almost as someone’s property. The lack of empowered mothers worsens the problem
of Indian child malnutrition.
I present a utility maximization model in which consumption smoothing gives parents an
economic incentive to invest in their children, where that incentive is larger for women who
face lower future income prospects. Social networks influence the mother’s allocation
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decision in three ways: first, support groups increase her disagreement utility, and allow
her greater control of household resources.3 Second, learning from friends removes
constraints placed by social norms, allowing the woman a greater range of choices in her
domestic life. Third, identity utility from belonging to networks causes a woman to be
influenced by her friends’ choices, and gain utility from mimicking their actions.
I collect primary data on self-reported networks, female empowerment, and child
nutrition in rural north India because existing datasets do not report information on peer
networks. The data are from the state of Uttarakhand, which is nestled in the Indian
Himalayas (the cross-hatched region in the inset of Figure 3.1). I identify a shock to female
bargaining power and social networks using a government program called Mahila
Samakhya. The program aims to increase female bargaining power through education and
has been in place in Uttarakhand since 1995 (program districts are represented with a
thick border in Figure 3.1). My survey area covers six randomly-chosen Uttarakhand
districts, four with the program and two without. (The survey districts are represented in
Figure 3.1 with a dotted pattern. The four districts with a thick border and dotted
patterns are program districts. The two dotted districts without a thick border are
non-program districts.)
The contributions of this paper are four-fold: first, I quantify the effect of peer networks
on female empowerment and child welfare; second, I decompose the total peer effect into its
component mechanisms. Third, I develop a theoretical framework describing the
interaction of networks and female bargaining power that synthesizes standard economic
theory (in the form of the Nash bargaining framework) with the demographic diffusion
literature, and identity economics. Fourth, I identify shocks to networks using the unique
Mahila Samakhya program, which expands and diversifies networks, and has strong
potential to replicated elsewhere in the developing world. I use primary data on
self-reported networks, as well as an innovative empirical technique that combines elements
3Disagreement or threat-point utility refers to the utility each adult receives if the household bargain fails
and cooperation breaks down (Mas Colell et al., 1995, p. 839).
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from spatial econometrics with a 3SLS approach.
Studying the links among networks, female empowerment, and child welfare helps us
understand how best to target development programs aimed at empowering women or
improving child welfare. While it has been shown that empowering women can improve
child outcomes, the factors determining female bargaining power are not completely
understood. If peer networks affect bargaining power and child outcomes, they need to be
taken into account when designing and evaluating development programs. Understanding
this relationship between female empowerment and child welfare will allow better targeting
of development programs. For instance, the importance of network ties suggests
development programs should target clusters of villages to exploit the social learning and
social influence effects of networks. Further, if improving female power has a sizable
marginal impact on child malnutrition, child welfare policies should also account for female
empowerment.
4.2 Literature Review
Economists often argue that since mothers invest more in their children than do fathers,
men and women have inherently different preferences with regard to household resource
allocation, and that as a result bargaining power affects the allocation of household
resources as well as labor supply decisions (Ghosh and Kanbur, 2008; Agarwal, 2001; Sahn
and Stifel, 2002; Quisumbing and de la Brie`re, 2000). As a result, a woman with little
bargaining power within the household gets a smaller share of the household’s resources
than a woman with more bargaining power (Phipps and Burton, 1998; Thomas, 1990).
Further, household resource allocations can vary significantly depending on who makes the
decisions: men spend most of the money on personal consumption while women channel a
large share to their children’s education and health (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994). Rather
than assume that women are more altruistic than men, my causal model provides women
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an economic incentive to invest in their children. Second, my model explicitly measures the
effect of peer networks on bargaining power and child welfare.
While the economic literature often ignores the role of networks in determining female
power, the demographic diffusion literature has extensively studied the impact of social
interactions on individual contraceptive use. Social learning and social influence describe
how individuals act on information acquired from peers (Montgomery and Casterline,
1996). In this literature, social learning occurs when women obtain information about
contraceptive methods from peers and family. Therefore, social networks provide
information and help individuals gauge the quality of the information (Kohler et al., 2001).
Social influence occurs when individuals act in similar ways to avoid conflict within the
social group. Networks also work through identity, providing examples to encourage
individuals to copy peers’ behavior (Behrman et al., 2002). Networks thus provide the set
of peers to whom we compare ourselves and relative to whom we define our
well-being (Akerlof, 1980).
Few papers have linked the theoretical advances of the contraceptive-use diffusion
literature with the female bargaining power literature. To my knowledge no other paper
has used self-reported networks in studying the determinants of female power and child
welfare. Second, to my knowledge, no other paper has empirically explored the mechanisms
through which self-reported peer networks affect female bargaining power. Can peer
networks increase women’s bargaining power and thereby improve child welfare? In this
paper, I examine the impact of more empowered peers on a woman’s say in household
decision making, and thus on the food intake of her children.
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4.3 Uttarakhand and The Mahila Samakhya Program
4.3.1 Background on Uttarakhand
Following decades of local demand for a separate state, Uttarakhand was carved out of the
state of Uttar Pradesh in November 2000. Small, scattered villages without access to roads
pose challenges to the state’s development. Most villages are remote and many lack basic
infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. Households generally engage in
subsistence-type agriculture, although the state also supplies migrant labor to Delhi and
other large towns. The literacy rate in Uttarakhand is 72 percent, lower than the national
average of 80 percent. However, the state is also relative wealthy: in 2005-06, only eight
percent of Uttarakhand households fell in the poorest wealth quintile nationally (IIPS and
Macro, 2007).
Uttarakhand has a large Hindu population— 85 percent as compared to 80 percent for
the entire country (of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2001), with 18
percent belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes.4 Caste hierarchy is strictly maintained
in Uttarakhandi villages, and most interactions are limited to members of the same caste.
Villages are clusters of houses that are isolated from other villages by the hilly terrain,
further limiting contact with others.
Villagers rely on the forest for firewood, water, and grass to feed livestock, while soil
erosion threatens farmers’ livelihood. As a result, Uttarakhandi people have long been
associated with an active interest in natural resource management. The Chipko movement
of the seventies is perhaps the most famous example in which Uttarakhandi villagers, and
women in particular, literally hugged trees to prevent felling.5 Villagers have also protested
the development of resorts and the diversion of water sources to richer communities.
4The Constitution of India categorizes the lower castes and tribes as Scheduled Castes and Tribes and
provides them special protections and rights to help overcome the effects of discrimination by higher castes.
5The Hindi word Chipko means to stick.
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4.3.2 The Status of Uttarakhandi Women
Alcoholism and resultant domestic violence are common problems in Uttarakhandi
families. Almost forty percent of Uttarakhandi men consume alcohol, compared to the
national average of 32 percent, and more than a quarter (26 percent) of all Uttarakhandi
women have experienced physical violence (IIPS and Macro, 2007). Only 18 percent of
these women— or about five percent of the overall population— have sought help to
control or end the violence. Uttarakhandi women thus not only have little say in their
household, but also frequently suffer from abuse.
Uttarakhandi women also tend to have very few social interactions outside the
immediate family. Firewood and water collection are women’s tasks and often consume
more than half the day. The remoteness of the region and lack of good roads combined
with stringent social norms mean that once married, women are unable to visit friends or
even parents regularly. As many as 47 percent of Uttarakhandi women reported not having
the final say on visits to family and friends (IIPS and Macro, 2007). Field tests and the
data suggest that women’s lives are defined by their husbands, children, and in-laws, and
they seldom participate in the political process, even at the village level. This state of
isolation and ignorance, accompanied by constricting social norms restrict women to the
narrow spheres of family and housework.
4.3.3 Mahila Samakhya in Uttarakhand
Mahila Samakhya is a women’s empowerment program that started in what is now
Uttarakhand in 1995. The program covers 2,416 villages in six of thirteen of Uttarakhandi
districts. More than 42,000 women participate in this program, and over 2,500 girls have
been educated in its centers. The program focuses on formal and informal education as the
means to empowerment. Literacy camps, adult education centers, and vocational training
enable participants to earn an income primarily through artisanry and store-keeping. In
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addition, the program provides special education on resolving domestic disputes and
conflicts within the community. However, program rollout is not always straightforward.
Local men sometimes resist the program and prevent their wives from participating. As a
result, initially only a few women may participate, but as others see the benefits of
participation, they muster up the courage to participate despite family opposition. Further,
as the family— chiefly husbands and in-laws— see the benefits from participation,
particularly through enhanced employability and increases in household income, they
reduce opposition to the program over time.
Village- and district-level meetings allow participants to step outside their homes and
villages, making their lives less solitary. Participants meet women from other castes and
religions, which expands their peer networks and lets them engage in conversation not
pertaining to domestic chores and family. The semi-formal and well-structured nature of
these interactions facilitates dialogue. The information provided by Mahila Samakhya as
well as that exchanged within the newly-expanded networks may help change social norms.
The learned vocational skills allow participants to engage in income-generating activities.
In particular, respondents are encouraged to acquire identification cards that enable them
to participate in the government’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS). NREGS guarantees at least a hundred days of paid work to the rural poor.
Participation in NREGS provides these women an income, which can increase household
bargaining power. Changed social norms and the ability to earn an income also enable
these women to have greater physical mobility.
4.4 The Causal Mechanisms
I hypothesize that Mahila Samakhya has two effects on female empowerment: one the
intended treatment effect of the program, and one the peer effect. The program treatment
effect works through education, while the peer effect works through the spillovers of social
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networks of both participants and their non-participant friends. Along with explicitly
providing participants information on various possibilities they might not otherwise know
about, information also has indirect effects by expanding the perceived feasible set for
participants. In addition, peer networks enable women to allocate more resources to their
children. And finally, Mahila Samakhya changes the norm faced by participants as well as
their identity utility.
The peer effect of participation in Mahila Samakhya can thus be summarized as follows:
the program (1) exposes her to new information, leading to social learning, (2) works
through social influence to ease constraints placed by norms, (3) increases the identity
utility received from belonging to a group, and (4) changes social norms.
4.4.1 Peer Effect
Social Learning
Participation expands peer networks and access to information. In interviews, participants
reported not even knowing five people outside their families prior to participation in the
program. Mahila Samakhya introduces them to many more women, and through them to
information on the opportunities and facilities available to women. Social learning can help
remove the constraints placed by norms so women have more choices. A woman can learn
new information from her peers. She may not have realized certain choices (for instance,
the ability to study or work) were available to her. This effect can be thought of “as
expanding the set of choices known to the woman” (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996, p.
158). Further, the outcomes of the educational and employment choices made by her
friends provide an “empirical demonstration of the range of consequences that can follow
from the adoption of a particular choice and may thereby shape the woman’s subjective
probability distributions” (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996, p. 158). Such learning is not
restricted to close friends and can occur through “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), such as
the ties with program participants from other villages.
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Information about new opportunities can also be valuable for it’s own sake. For instance,
one interviewed participant said that just knowing that women were successful lawyers,
diplomats, professors, and entrepreneurs changed her outlook on life. The information
caused her to want to earn an income and be more self-reliant. This effect of information is
consistent with the finding that urban Indian women with access to cable television were
more empowered than those without cable television (Jensen and Oster, 2009).
Social Influence
Strong networks provide support groups that influence individual behavior and increase the
woman’s power within her household. Individuals also learn from and are influenced by
friends. Observing peers adopt new behaviors influences a woman’s behavior because she
trusts her peers and their judgment. Participants have more opportunities to interact with
their peers, especially away from home. They develop a stronger network that can support
them if they face domestic violence, or help change the household resource allocation. A
woman with no support group may remain in the status quo for fear of being ostracized.
By organizing women into support groups, the program can increase their power within
the household and community without fear of social sanction. The support group also
intervenes directly when a participant’s family refuses to improve its treatment of her. In
field tests, a participant reported that her Mahila Samakhya network intervened when her
husband and in-laws did not allow her to feed her daughter as well as her son. Another
respondent said that her husband’s treatment of her improved after she joined Mahila
Samakhya because he was worried that program officials would intervene in his domestic
life and shame him in the village.
Identity Utility
As well as improving connections with existing peers, Mahila Samakhya alters peer sets
by expanding networks. The program changes the participant’s relative set of peers so that
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the people she compares herself with are now more educated and have less traditional
attitudes about women’s role in society. In initial interviews, respondents often talked of
the pride they felt in being program participants, and how they were happier because of
the changes in their peer network. Non-participants have weaker ties to peers, hence their
identity utility from belonging to a network is lower than that of participants. Peers
behave like one another not only to avoid conflict and to coordinate with each other but
also because they gain identity utility from being insiders in the group (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2010). Identity is endogenous and thus identity utility is influenced by changes in
the reference group.
However, for non-participants, the constraints placed by social norms and identity utility
are likely unchanged by the program because the village continues to be their reference
group, until a critical mass of participants is achieved and the social norms themselves
change.
Effects on Social Norms
More empowered, educated, and mobile women can change the village culture.
Participants told us that before joining the program they faced a constricting social norm,
reinforced by the village culture. They could not work, were barely educated, had little say
in the resources allocated to their children, and were told to discriminate against
daughters. Their identity was always subsumed in their husband’s, brother’s, father’s, or
in-laws’ identity. After participating in Mahila Samakhya, women realize they have their
own identity, that they can work if they want to, that they should study, and that they can
influence household and community decisions. In the long run, as more people invest in
their children, and investments become more equitable between the two sexes, the village
culture will reflect the new patterns in investment.
The question then arises, why do social norms that harm individuals persist in the
absence of an intervention like Mahila Samakhya, and how do network-based learning and
influence interact with such norms? Akerlof (1980) notes social norms disadvantageous to
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individuals may persist for fear of social sanction by the group against the individual
trying to challenge the social norm— social influence at work. Further, people may not
want to be outliers because of a negative feedback loop resulting from the social relativism
of others. Program participants often reported being unsure what others would say if they
tried to stand up to their in-laws or stop their husbands from hitting them— “We did not
want to risk being different.” However, the program provided them an in-built support
group to help them challenge the status quo.
4.5 Model
In this section, I present a theoretical model that concretizes the causal mechanisms
described above. To start, I model the husband and wife as playing a cooperative Nash
bargaining game. If the bargain breaks down, the husband and wife each receive
disagreement utility, which is lower than what they would have received if the bargain had
been successful (McElroy, 1990; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). The standard household
Nash bargaining model does not account for the role of networks in determining
disagreement utility, nor for the effects of identity utility or social learning and influence on
the outcome of the bargain. The disagreement utility is simply each spouse’s intertemporal
utility if they remained single or if they were non-cooperating in marriage, and depends on
the spouse’s own earning potential and the partner’s earning potential as well as on the
non-cooperative equilibrium outcome of investment in children.
To incorporate networks into the Nash bargaining model, first, I model the adults as
making a joint decision by maximizing the generalized Nash product, x, comprising a
private good c, leisure l, and a public good reflected by investment in children r. Each
adult’s say in the household represented by the exponents α and β, which sum to one and
reflect the relative levels of bargaining power captured by husband and wife. These
exponents can depend on social norms, and can change over time to reflect more equitable
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norms. The bargain leads to optimal values of the bundle for each adult, x∗. These
consumption bundles belong to a set {X} of all possible choices of x. In period one, the
adults choose their optimal x for each time period to maximize the current period utility
and expected utility in the next time period.
To model constraints imposed by social norms, I make the set of choices X known to an
individual a mapping of the set of observed choices available to his/her peers XN . The
observed set of choices available to peers, XN , is in turn the union of all the consumption
bundles chosen by them.6 The more diverse a woman’s network, the larger is XN , and the
more empowered her peers, the greater is her set of high-utility (to her) options in the
choice set. Therefore, the social norm is less constraining on women with diverse networks
that include some highly empowered peers.
Second, I represent the influence of networks by assuming individuals receive utility by
being better off than their peers, and a suffer a penalty to utility if they are worse than
their peers. The additional bonus or penalty utility is denoted as Ur, and is a function of
the average utility of the social network, N . I thus add identity utility Ur from the relative
set or network N , to each utility function. Since male and female networks are different, I
use the subscripts m and f to denote these differences. Identity utility can be negative if
the individual is worse-off than her reference group, and positive if she is not worse off than
her peers. Note also that identity utility increases in the strength of ties. The third change
to the basic Nash bargaining problem reflects social influence on individual bargaining
power by making disagreement utilities V a function of networks because networks can
provide support in domestic disputes and limit the potential for social sanction.
The household thus faces the following maximization problem with respect to the
constraints on x described above, and a full-income budget constraint.
6The set XN does not include choices available to peers but not chosen by them because the maximizing
individual only observes his/her peers actions. For instance, the participant who said that knowing women
can be lawyers, doctors etc. empowered her did not say that knowing that women know they can be lawyers
also empowered her. Therefore, I assume only the observed x∗ matters. Although women with access
to televisions may see women on cable shows being employed as lawyers, etc., actually meeting a woman
engaged in professional employment is likely more salient and has a greater impact.
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max
xf ,xm
[Uf (xf ,1) + EUf (xf ,2) + Ur(Nf ,x
∗
Nf
)− Vf (Nf )]α
[Um(xm,1) + EUm(xm,2) + Ur(Nm,x
∗
Nm)− Vm(Nm)]β
s.t. 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7
(4.1)
x ∈ {X} (4.2)
X = f(XN) (4.3)
XN =
⋃
x∗N (4.4)
The household’s full-income budget constraint (FIBC) derives from the individual
budget constraints faced by the man and the woman. Each gets utility from consuming the
vector of goods x in each time period. The vectors pm and pf reflect the prices faced by
the man and the woman, including wages. The prices associated with the private good c
and leisure l are pc, wf for the woman, and wm for the man. I model the public good r as
the numeraire, hence the associated price is one. Since women have a lower expected wage
and a longer life expectancy, they have an economic incentive to invest more in their
children. Hence, the woman’s optimal choice of r is greater than the man’s optimal choice.
The woman’s share of the household’s resources, θ, is parametrically defined by α and β;
these shares are given by norms and are not a bargaining outcome. The woman’s FIBC
looks as follows:
pf (xf ,1 + xf ,2) ≤ θ(α, β)
[∑
t=1,2
Yf,t + (Ym,1 + ρYm,2) + E(Tf ) + ρE(Tm)
]
(4.5)
where ρ represents the probability that the woman is married in period 2. E(T ) refers to
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the expected transfers from children. The man’s FIBC looks as follows:
pm(xm,1 + xm,2) ≤ (1− θ(α, β))
[∑
t=1,2
Ym,t + (Yf,1 + ρYf,2) + E(Tm) + ρE(Tf )
]
(4.6)
Adding up the constraints in equation 4.5 and equation 4.6 yields the full-income budget
constraint faced by the household (equation 4.7).
pf (xf ,1 + xf ,2) + pm(xm,1 + xm,2) ≤∑
t=1,2
Ym,t + θ(α, β)
[∑
t
Yf,t −
∑
t
Ym,t
]
+ θ(α, β)(Ym,1 + ρYm,2 − Yf,1 − ρYf,2)
+(Yf,1 + ρYf,2) + [E(Tm) + ρ(E(Tf )− θ(α, β)E(Tm)− θ(α, β)ρE(Tf ))]
(4.7)
In this model, parents invest in children for consumption smoothing purposes. An
increase in education raises bargaining power, and potential household and individual
income, which have different effects on investments in children. Education raises
investment in children only so far as higher bargaining power outweighs the countervailing
effect of increased potential individual income. Education no longer increases investment in
children once the increase in bargaining power is smaller than the increase in potential
income. However, due to consumption smoothing, the increased differential in current
versus future household income increases demand for future transfers, and thus investment
in children. As long as women live longer than men and have lower average income, an
increase in women’s educational attainment will thus increase investment in children.
Consider the husband and wife’s utility to be the outputs produced by the household;
these outputs are a function of the utility from labor allocation, consumption, investment
in children, and participation in networks. A household utility possibilities frontier (UPF)
gives us all the feasible pairs of husband and wife utility production. Following the earlier
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discussion, the model yields four ways in which networks affect female empowerment: (1)
Levels of and changes in bargaining power can affect the observed equilibrium. If a woman
does not have much bargaining power, the equilibrium will result in greater utility to the
husband than to the wife. (2) Not knowing about all the choices or feasible levels of utility
might constrain the equilibrium to a subset of the full UPF. The social norm might
constrict the whole household, but women differentially than women so they do not realize
that certain high levels of utility are attainable. (3) Finally, if the woman’s relative set of
peers follow the social norm, i.e. do not work and have little or no education, the
household may be on a lower UPF than it would otherwise. (4) Over time, the social
norms might change as a result of more women participating in Mahila Samakhya.
4.5.1 Social Learning
Social learning enables Mahila Samakhya to change the social norm through the
“expansion of the set of choices available to women” and the “the empirical demonstration
of the range of consequences” from adopting certain behaviors (Montgomery and
Casterline, 1996, p. 158). Figure 4.1 illustrates how the constraints placed by the program
can restrict the UPF to a small portion of the true frontier. Point A is a possible
equilibrium outcome, at which the husband’s utility is UmA and the wife’s utility is U
f
A.
However, neither spouse knows the extent of true UPF because social norms constrain their
choice sets to less than the full feasible set. Constraints on the husband restrict the frontier
along the x-axis, while constraints on the wife limit the frontier along the y-axis. Point B is
on the same UPF but is not available because the higher level of female utility it represents
is ruled out by social norms. The indirect network effect of Mahila Samakhya removes the
constraints— initially only for the woman, but eventually also for her husband. Point B
now becomes feasible. A move to point B would increase her utility (U fB > U
f
A) and
decrease her husband’s utility (UmB < U
m
A ). While this discussion treats the bargain as a
zero-sum game, newly-expanded networks can in fact improve the entire household’s utility
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by empowering the woman to earn an income and thus expanding the household UPF.
4.5.2 Social Influence
Figure 4.2 represents the household’s utility space, a UPF, and the equilibrium resulting
from the husband and wife’s choice sets. The dashed lines represent the husband and wife’s
levels of disagreement utility. If the bargain breaks down, they receive Vm and Vf ,
represented in utility-space by the intersection of the two dashed lines. The disagreement
utilities place lower bounds on the UPF with respect to the x− and y− axes. Now consider
the situation in which a woman near the disagreement utility joins Mahila Samakhya, and
the resultant support group intervenes in her domestic situation and increases her
disagreement utility so that she is better-off even if the bargain breaks down. Also consider
the case in which her husband’s disagreement utility decreases because the support group
forces him to improve his treatment of her. The new disagreement utilities, represented by
the dotted lines, expose a previously-unattainable part of the UPF that represents higher
utility to the woman, and limits part of the UPF associated with lower utility to her.
The anecdote of the woman who said her husband’s treatment of her improved after she
joined the program because he was afraid of being shamed in the village illustrates this
effect on bargaining power. Further, by providing support groups the program decreases
the woman’s fear of ostracism and empowers her to change her situation within the
household. Social influence thus enables the woman to change the available UPF to include
better outcomes for her and restrict the possibilities that make her worse off. The
educational effect of the program also increases the woman’s disagreement utility because
knowing about better job prospects and having more marketable skills raise her expected
wages and thus increase her bargaining power. Note that the observed outcomes in the
event of a breakdown in the bargain depends on social norms, as reflected by parameters α
and β as well. Participation in Mahila Samakhya changes both the level of disagreement
utility as well as α and β.
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4.5.3 Identity Utility
The third effect of networks might be to shift the UPF available to the household. The
woman’s utility is a function of the attitude or actions of her relative set of peers that she
observed in the previous period. She defines her well-being relative to this set, and gains
identity utility from behaving like the people in the set (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). If
these peers have traditional attitudes and adhere to the social norm although it
discriminates against them, their ties are likely to be weak, hence the woman’s gain in
identity utility is also low. Such a relative set leaves little scope for social learning and may
cause the woman’s household to be on a lower UPF than they can attain. However, identity
also has a relative component. The woman gains utility from being at least as well off as
her peers, and loses utility if she is worse-off than them. By observing other women holding
jobs and being educated, the woman is motivated to make similar changes in her life.
If the program strengthens a woman’s peer network, she stands to gain identity utility.
The program also introduces her to more empowered women, who likely receive a greater
share of the household’s utility. She now needs an even higher level of utility than before in
order to be as well off as her peers. At point A in figure 4.3, without accounting for
identity utility, the woman receives U fA in utility. However, her peers have some arbitrarily
chosen higher level of utility, U1r , which effectively shifts back her UPF. After accounting
for this loss in utility, the woman only receives U f,rA . The loss in utility from U
f
A to U
f,r
A
represents the negative identity utility to the woman from being worse off than her peers.
If the equilibrium occurs at point B, the woman is better off than her peers, which is
represented by a shifting out her of her UPF. The gain in identity utility means she
effectively receives U f,rB , which is greater than U
f
B. Now if the woman’s relative set changes
because of Mahila Samakhya and the new relative set has higher utility, U2r , the woman
needs a greater gain in utility to be as well-off as before. Now, some parts of the UPF
(between X and Y on the y−axis, where she was better-off than a less empowered relative
set) shift in because she is worse off than her new relative set. Stronger networks from
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participation thus lead to a greater change in identity utility than a weaker network.
4.5.4 Social Norms
Even without the constraints, a move from A to B would not be observed if the woman’s
bargaining power was very low. The household’s relative value of a woman’s happiness
increases in the woman’s bargaining power, hence the slope of the indifference curve at the
point of tangency to the UPF is the ratio of bargaining powers, BPf/BPm. To observe an
equilibrium where the woman gets a larger share of utility, the value of the exponent α
must increase. The values of α and β depend on social norms. If the culture is such that
women do not get a large share of utility, then α will continue to be low. By changing
endogenous individual characteristics like education and mobility, Mahila Samakhya
changes the norms. Over time, exposure to the program can result in a new culture where
the exponents are similar in magnitude, reflecting a more equal distribution of bargaining
power.
In this framework, the peer effect of the program works through networks to change the
woman’s bargaining power, increase the feasible set of choices available to her, and change
the UPF that is attainable to her household. The model presented here yields testable
hypotheses.
4.6 Data
Household data from India do not include information on self-reported networks, and
preclude an analysis of the effect of networks on child welfare. Researchers have used caste
to proxy for peers in India because caste is a strong signifier of networks (Munshi and
Rosenzweig, 2006), but there may be networks of varying strength within castes. As a
result, I collect data from the north Indian state of Uttarakhand on instruments for social
learning, influence, female power, and their role on child nutrition outcomes. In addition, I
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also collect data on participation in Mahila Samakhya. Program centers have been present
in Uttarakhand villages for periods lasting anywhere from three months to five years,
allowing me to use time-variation in exposure to the program to identify its impact on
networks and child nutrition.
The data are from six of thirteen Uttarakhand districts, four with the program and two
without. The sample size is 487 women. When field testing the questionnaire, most
participants reported regularly communicating with fewer than five people outside their
families, particularly prior to program participation. As a result, five appeared to be an
effective upper limit on network size in my sample. Hence, I employ restricted snowball
sampling where I interviewed a randomly-chosen woman and asked her to list her five
closest friends. I then conducted follow-up interviews with two randomly-selected women
from these five friends. Thus, starting with one woman, my sampling strategy gave me a
network of seven. My survey instrument includes the following key questions:
• Networks:
– Who are your five closest friends and how do you know these people? How often
do you see them? Where do you usually see them?
– Do you participate in the Mahila Samakhya intervention? Do your closest
friends participate?
– How important is it to you and your husband what your friends and the
community think of you?
• Proxies for Female Empowerment:
– At what age did you (first) get married? What is your husband’s age? (These
questions allow me to compute the spouses’ age ratio, and determine whether
the woman was married before the legal limit of eighteen.)
– What is your level of education? What is your husband’s level of education?
(These questions allow me to compute the spouses’ education ratio.)
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• Investment in Children:
– How much food has each child eaten in the past 24 hours? (Enumerators carried
standard bowls and asked respondents to estimate how many bowls of food each
child ate.)
– How much do you spend each month on your children’s education?
These questions will help us identify the effect of peer networks on an individual’s
household bargaining power and therefore on child welfare.
4.6.1 Summary Statistics
As Table 4.1 shows, the average woman in my sample was 32 years old, while her husband
is 38 years old. She married at age 19 and has 9 years of education, while her husband has
an additional year of education. The average age of her sons is 8, and that of her daughters
is 6. The average woman’s house has three rooms and electricity. Table 4.2 tells us that
78.17 percent of the program participants but only 58.82 percent of non-participants could
leave the house without permission. Similarly, while 68.02 percent of participants have
NREGS identification cards, only 48.94 percent of non-participants do. Table 4.3 shows
that participants’ children also consume more rice, lentils, and dairy than non-participants
children.
As established in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, participants might select into Mahila
Samakhya, but evidence suggests that the program is not targeted by geographic area in
any meaningful way. Further, poorer participants neither select into the program nor are
they targeted based on indicators of wealth (number of rooms, electrification, access to
improved toilet facilities, and nature of the construction materials used for the floor and
walls of the house). As a result, my identification strategy involves accounting for
endogenous program participation.
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4.7 Identification Strategy
The empirical analysis occurs in two steps: first, I identify causal peer effects. I instrument
for the endogeneity of program participation using exposure to the program, and for the
endogeneity of networks using the number of other women in the village with a similar time
to collect water and the number of other women in the village of the same caste. Second, I
study the mechanisms through which the peer effects work: social learning, social influence,
identity utility, and changing social norms. Note that peer effects can work directly on
participants themselves, and also indirectly through the friends of participants. As a result,
the change in reference group afforded by the program is essentially a peer effect.
4.7.1 Endogeneity of Program Participation
Because participation in Mahila Samakhya is most likely endogenous, I consider the
number of years a participant has lived in a village with Mahila Samakhya as an adult. I
use the threshold of 16 for adulthood because program participants can be no younger than
16 years of age. This variable tells us the potential years of exposure of an adult to the
program, and is thus correlated with participation. Further, any effect of this variable on
female empowerment likely works through participation in the program, rather than
directly. This variable is driven by the year the program started as there is little migration
among married women in the region. Since women often migrate at the time of marriage,
the exposure to the program might have started in their natal village through a participant
friend or parent. I do not know whether the woman’s natal village had the program, so
migration at the time of marriage might lead to measurement error, which in turn would
bias results downwards. However, as noted earlier, unmarried women do not participate in
the program, so exposure would have to be indirect, and thus the resultant bias would be
small.
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4.7.2 Identifying Peer Effects
The reflection problem confounds identification of causal peer effects (Manski, 1993). Do
people behave in similar ways because they have learned from or been influenced by their
friends, or are they friends because they behave in similar ways? Manski presents three
hypotheses regarding the observed similarities in the behavior of friends. (1) Correlated
effects occur when people act alike because they face a similar environment or have similar
characteristics. (2) Contextual effects describe the fact that individuals are more likely to
act in a given way depending on the distribution of group members’ characteristics. (3)
Endogenous effects represent the phenomenon where the group affects individual behavior
through social interaction. The third effect is key to identifying the causal network effect.
Much of the literature following Manski has focused on the econometric issue of
separating the causal peer effect from that of correlated unobservables (Conley and Udry,
2010; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). A straightforward way of
disentangling these effects is to randomize the intervention or new technology at the
friend-level (Oster and Thornton, 2009). The Mahila Samakhya intervention is not
randomized, so my identification strategy combines an instrumental variables approach
with a spatial weighting technique (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998).
Recent extensions of spatial econometrics to networks have relied on the Generalized
Spatial 2SLS estimator by using partially overlapping networks (Bramoulle` et al., 2009;
Giorgi et al., 2010). A limitation of our data (and most available datasets, including those
used earlier) is that I do not know entire networks, simply five of the woman’s friends.
Rather than assume that these five friends comprise the woman’s entire network, I use
information on caste and time to collect water to instrument for the endogeneity of
networks, in addition to instrumenting for own participation. As a result, my estimation is
conducted using a 3SLS estimator with network-weighted independent variables.
Water collection tends to take about 24 minutes each day, for participants and
non-participants alike. Villages in the survey region tend to have multiple water sources.
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Since the houses within a village are clustered, women face very similar times to collect
water, with the variation being driven by topography: some women choose to go to more
proximate water sources, which maybe involve a steeper climb, while other walk a longer
distance if the walk is less hilly. Thus, for any given village, women with similar times to
collect water are likely to go to the same source. So, I treat women with times to collect
water within one standard deviation of each other as potential friends. I also treat women
of the same caste within a village as potential friends. I then generate two network weights
matrices: one which identifies all self-reported friends, and a second that identifies all
potential friends using caste and time to collect water. I multiply the caste- and
water-time-based weights matrices with the vectors of average age of sons and time to
collect fuel to generate instruments for the true weighted participation of friends. These
network-weighted instruments thus reflect the average number of years all potential friends
have lived, as adults, in a village with the program.
Even after identifying the causal effect, correlated effects continue to be a source of bias,
particularly in the presence of proxy-reported peer behavior (Hogset and Barrett, 2010).
Since we conduct follow-up interviews with friends (called snowball sampling), our data
face reduced problems with measurement error due to proxy reports. The combination of
snowball sampling and the use of instruments for the endogeneity of social networks allows
us to isolate the effect of interactions from that of the individual group shock.
4.7.3 Decomposing the Mechanisms
In the section on causal mechanisms, I described four major channels through which peer
networks and Mahila Samakhya affect female bargaining power and child welfare: social
learning, social influence, identity utility, and social norms. Below I describe the proxies
that use to measure each of these mechanisms (summarized in Table 4.4), and the expected
signs on the corresponding right-hand side variables (summarized in Table 4.5). Since I
measure the mechanisms using proxies, I cannot rule out that the proxies for a mechanism
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might be contaminated by observables or unobservables correlated with one of the other
mechanisms. However, as outlined below, I posit that these proxies primarily pick up the
mechanism they are intended to measure. Further, I tested the robustness of results using
different proxies for the mechanisms; results are robust.
Social learning removes constraints on PPF: Intuitively, these constraints will be more
binding on women who do not have much access to information before the program. My
hypothesis is that women with little education are less exposed to information than those
with five or more years of education, and thus have more to gain through social learning.
Hence, I measure this effect using low education, and interaction with own participation
and friends’ participation in Mahila Samakhya. I define low education as four or fewer
years of education. Most women in our sample (72.24 percent) had at least five years of
education. As a result, I expect the interactions of low education with own and friends’
participation to have positive effects on female bargaining power and child food intake
outcomes, while low education by itself is likely to have a negative effect on the outcomes.
I model social influence as increasing disagreement utility, which most affects women
whose agreement utility is close to their actual disagreement utility in the event of a
bargaining breakdown. These women are likely those with particularly low initial
bargaining power, which I proxy for using the spouses’ age ratio. Women become part of
strong support groups when they participate in Mahila Samakhya, which increases their
disagreement utility in the event that they do not reach a successful bargain with their
husband. Women who have very low initial bargaining power, but now participate in
Mahila Samakhya may gain more from social influence than those with higher initial
bargaining power. However, since bargaining power itself is an outcome of program
participation, I need to use a measure of bargaining power that is likely to remain
unchanged by participation. I use the spousal age ratio to capture this initial bargaining
power effect. I expect the interaction of program participation and the spousal age ratio
proxy to have a positive effect on our outcome variables.
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Identity utility from belonging to a group shifts out the PPF. Presumably the degree to
which a woman cares about her social group’s opinion will affect the potential utility gains
from associating more closely with the group. I capture this effect of identity utility using
whether a woman cares a lot about her friends’ opinion of her (referred to here on as
Friends’ Opinion (Women)), and interacting this degree of care with her own participation
and weighed participation. The more a woman cares, the greater the identity utility she
gains from being part of her group of friends. Since I argue that participation in Mahila
Samakhya increases a woman’s identity utility, I expect the interaction terms between own
and friends’ program participation and caring about friends’ opinions to have a positive
effect on outcomes.
Social norms constrain women’s behavior and their choice sets. The greater the influence
of norms on the household, presumably the more are women bound by these constraints. I
proxy for the strength of the norms faced by a woman via whether the husband cares a lot
about villagers’ opinion of him (referred to here on as Villagers’ Opinion (Men)), interacted
with both her own and friends’ participation. The more the husband cares about villagers’
opinion, the more constraining are social norms, and so I expect a negative direct effect on
outcomes. However, I expect own and friends’ program participation to somewhat mitigate
the effect of constraining social norms on individuals. Increasing the number of empowered
women in the village also directly changes social norms if the norm is for women not to be
empowered. Hence, the interaction terms with husbands caring about villagers opinion
should have positive effects on outcome variables.
4.7.4 Dependent variables and mechanisms
I use two dependent variables for female bargaining power: whether the woman owns an
NREGS identification card, and whether she is able to leave the house without permission.
Here, I describe which of the mechanisms I expect to be significant determinants of these
measures of bargaining power. I also describe the effect of empowerment and peer networks
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on children’s food intake since this paper also studies whether more empowered women in
fact invest more in their children.
NREGS : I expect participation in NREGS to be primarily affected by social learning
and influence. The women might not know it is possible for them to work, particularly in
the predominantly construction/ manual labor jobs offered by the NREGS. However,
learning alone does not tell a complete story; even after learning that they can participate
in NREGS, women often need Mahila Samakhya support in order to get the necessary
identification cards to work in the program.
Being able to leave the house without permission: I expect social influence to be the
dominant mechanism here, although social learning and identity utility are likely important
as well. Women who participate in Mahila Samakhya have support groups so they do not
fear ostracism by the local community for going out without permission. However, they
also may not have realized that they could leave the house without permission, and only
learned that they could from participating in the program. Finally, identifying as a
“Mahila Samakhya participant” and identifying with the other (more mobile than average)
participants might empower a woman to leave the house without permission.
Children’s food intake: I consider the natural logs of rice, lentil, and dairy consumption
in the past day. For food consumption, I expect learning to be the most important because
women, particularly those with low education, may not know how much to feed young
children. However, for the relatively expensive non-staples such as dairy, identity utility
might have a more significant effect. Allocating more lentils or dairy to children might
mean the husband gets less food, which is more likely to happen if the woman identifies
herself with a more empowered group of peers. I also expect norms to be important
because how much one’s children eat is likely affected by what other, perhaps older people
in the village feed their children. The more the husband cares about the villagers’ opinion
of him, the more likely children are to be well-fed.
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4.8 Results
The female empowerment and child welfare results presented below come from one of two
sets of regressions. The first, a “base” regression, does not include any of the interaction
terms outlined in Table 4.5, and simply tells us whether own and friends’ participation in
the program increase female empowerment or improve child welfare, while controlling for
(1) the woman’s personal characteristics, such as low educational attainment, age, opinion
1 and 2, (2) household demographic characteristics: the number and average age of the
woman’s children, whether the household is Brahmin, and whether the parents in-law live
in the household, and (3) measures of household wealth, such as the number of rooms and
electrification. The second, a “mechanism” regression, includes, in addition to the above
three characteristic sets, the interaction terms from Table 4.5. The mechanism regression
thus disentangles the components effects of peer networks.
Table 4.6 presents the program-related OLS results of the effect of own and friends’
participation in Mahila Samakhya on female empowerment (full regression results are
presented in table 4.13 in the Ancillary Tables section). When compared with the
program-related 3SLS results in Table 4.7, these results highlight the bias introduced by
endogenous program participation, and the importance of correcting for such bias (full
regression results are presented in table 4.14 in the Ancillary Tables section). The
outcomes of female empowerment used are those presented in Table 4.2: owning NREGS
identification card and going out without permission. The first and third columns of results
in Table 4.6 present the base OLS results. These results suggest that Mahila Samakhya
participants are more empowered than non-participants: they are significantly more likely
to own an NREGS identification card, and to leave the house without permission.
However, friends’ participation does not appear to be significantly correlated with
empowerment. In the mechanism regressions (columns two and four of results), the only
significant mechanism is that of changing norms: women with more participant friends are
less constricted by their husbands’ caring about the villagers’ opinion of him.
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Table 4.7 presents the 3SLS (and thus instrumented) results for a regression of own and
peers’ participation in Mahila Samakhya on the female bargaining power outcomes (full
regression results are presented in table 4.14 in the Ancillary Tables section). These results
show that participants are significantly more likely to leave the house without permission,
and close-to-significantly (t-stat of 1.43) more likely to have NREGS cards. The differences
between these effects and those from the OLS regression highlight the endogeneity
problem. The mechanism regression also tells us that friends’ participation makes a woman
significantly more likely to leave without permission; this effect is lower for women who are
themselves participants. The greater a woman’s identity utility—the more she cares about
her peers’ opinion of her (Friends’ Opinion (Women))— the less likely she is to have an
NREGS card. The more the husband cares about villagers’ opinion (the more constraining
are social norms on the husband and therefore on the wife), the less likely women are to
have NREGS identification cards or to leave without permission. These results also tell us
that richer women (those with electricity) are less likely to go out without permission, and
that Brahmin women are less likely to have NREGS cards.
To interpret the mechanism regression results, Table 4.8 presents marginal effects.
Overall, participants are significantly more likely to go out without permission, but the
total direct effect on owning an NREGS card is not significantly different from zero.
However, the effect of own participation on participants is negative for both outcome
variables. A result that highlights the importance of peer networks is that, for
non-participants, friends’ participation significantly increases a woman’s ability to leave the
house without permission. Of the mechanisms, social learning and social influence play the
most important roles in female empowerment. Social learning is a key mechanism: women
with low education are significantly more likely to go out without permission as a result of
own and friends’ participation. These are the women who stand to gain the most from the
informational content of networks, and the fact that the program benefits them the most
suggests that social learning is an important component of the peer effect.
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Social influence also plays a major role in determining female empowerment, as own
participation significantly improves both outcomes for women with greater initial
bargaining power as measured by the spousal age ratio. In other words, program
participation significantly increases the disagreement utilities of the participating women
and empowers them. Identity utility and changing norms, while insignificant for NREGS
card ownership, significantly improve empowerment as measured by the permission
variable. Identity utility through own and friends’ participation, in particular, increases the
likelihood of a woman leaving the house without permission for the average woman, and for
participants alone. Friends’ participation also interacts significantly with the identity
utility measure (importance of friends’ opinion) for the average woman and the average
participant. In summary, peer networks work through social influence and learning to
significantly empower women.
Table 4.9 presents the program-related OLS results of own and friends’ participation in
Mahila Samakhya on children’s food intake (full regression results are presented in
table 4.15 in the Ancillary Tables section). The three categories of food are rice, lentils
(dal), and dairy. In addition to the woman’s personal characteristics, household
demographic characteristics, and measures of household wealth described above, the right
hand side variables for these outcomes include the husband and wife’s consumption of the
corresponding food group. Base results imply that participation significantly increases
children’s rice and dairy consumption. Older women, and women closer in age to their
husbands have significantly better-fed children, while Brahmin children eat smaller
amounts of rice and lentils. Children of women who care more about their friends’ opinion
consume significantly more dairy. Women with more participant friends have a greater
impact of caring about those friends’ opinion. Similarly, the effect of a husband caring
about villagers’ opinion is smaller for participants than non-participants. The wife’s lentil
and dairy consumption are associated with significant increases in the child’s consumption.
Although insignificant, the husband’s food consumption is negatively correlated with
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children’s consumption in all but the dairy mechanism regression, suggesting perhaps
substitution in food allocation.
Table 4.10 presents the program-related base 3SLS results of the effect of own and
friends’ participation in Mahila Samakhya on children’s food intake (full regression results
are presented in table 4.16 in the Ancillary Tables section). That the OLS results are
stronger than these instrumented ones tells us that more empowered women likely select
into the program and feed their children better. These results suggest that neither own nor
friends’ participation has any direct effect on children’s consumption of rice, lentils, or
dairy. However, older women and women closer in age to their husbands have significantly
better-fed children for all three food types. As with the OLS results, the wife’s lentil and
dairy consumption increase children’s consumption of these foods, while the husband’s
consumption levels are always negatively related with those by his children. Table 4.11
presents the corresponding mechanism 3SLS results (full regression results are presented in
table 4.17 in the Ancillary Tables section). These results show that own participation
significantly increases children’s intake of rice and dairy. Children born to women with less
education eat smaller quantities of rice and dairy, while children of older women eat more.
Children of a woman closer in age to her husband eat significantly more rice and dairy.
Of the mechanisms, social influence through the program appears to be most important
in the food intake regressions: children of women with low initial bargaining power (those
with a low age ratio) eat more rice and dairy due to their mothers’ participation in the
program. Identity utility significantly influences the intake of rice as the effect of caring
about the friends’ opinion is greatest for women with more participant friends. Binding
social norms actually appear to improve child welfare, as the more the husband cares about
the villagers’ opinion of him, the more rice and dairy his children eat. The signs and
significance levels of the husband and wife’s rice, lentil, and dairy consumption is consistent
with the OLS and base 3SLS results presented above.
The marginal effects presented in Table 4.12 tell us that on average, participation
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significantly increases rice and dairy consumption by children, although friends’
participation appears to slightly decrease lentil consumption. Both social learning and
influence have significant positive effects on dairy consumption, suggesting that for
relatively expensive non-staples, peer networks can have a sizable impact on children’s food
consumption. Social learning is also a significant determinant of rice consumption. Identity
utility, through own participation also significantly improves rice and dairy intake for the
average woman’s child. Finally, as suggested by the base and mechanism regressions, social
norms appear to help improve child food intake. In summary, social learning, identity
utility, and social norms play important roles in improving child food intake.
First stage results of the 3SLS regressions for empowerment and child food intake are
reported in the Ancillary Tables section. As described above, I instrument for own
participation using potential exposure to the Mahila Samakhya program, and friends’
participation using the number of women in the village with similar time to water source
and same caste interacted with the participation instrument. Table 4.18 presents the first
stage results for the empowerment regressions, while Table 4.19 presents the first stage for
the base regressions on children’s food intake, and Table 4.20 the mechanism regressions for
children’s food intake.
The first stage results from the two sets of regressions (empowerment and children’s food
intake) are very similar on some counts: the regressions instrumenting for own
participation tell us that exposure to the program is significantly negatively associated
with participation, perhaps because older women tend not to participate in the program
and have lived in the village for several years. As expected, women who live with their
in-laws are less likely to participate in both sets of first stage regressions.
However, then some differences emerge in the two sets of first stage regressions: in the
first stage of the empowerment outcomes regressions, women with higher spousal age ratios
(and thus higher initial bargaining power) are significantly likely to participate, as are
Brahmins, and women who care more about their friends’ opinion. In the first stage of the
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food outcomes regressions, Brahmins continue to be more likely to participate, and the
spousal age ratio is still positively correlated with own participation, but the estimate is
just shy of significance at the ten percent level except in the rice regression. However,
caring about one’s friends’ opinion is no longer near significance. In the food regressions, we
also find that older women are significantly more likely to participate, while the coefficient
was insignificant in the empowerment regressions. Finally, friends’ participation is
associated with an increase in own participation for the empowerment outcome regressions,
although the coefficient is only significant in the mechanism regressions. However, the effect
of friends’ participation is negative on own participation for the food intake regressions.
In all the first stage regressions for friends’ participation, the time to collect water and
caste instruments are both highly significantly correlated with participation. However, the
interaction of the time to collect water with the participation instrument is always
negatively correlated with the number of friends’ participating, while the weighted caste
instrument is always positively correlated with the number of participant friends. In the
regressions instrumenting for the interaction proxies that aim to capture mechanisms, the
instruments (predicted own/friends’ participation times the mechanism proxy) are also
significantly and positively correlated with the instrumented interaction term.
4.8.1 Sensitivity Analyses
Alternative Instrumental Variables for Participation
Initial interviews revealed that program participants often have older sons, and a longer
time to collect firewood. As a result, I tried the age of sons7 and time to collect fuel as
alternative instruments. Parents in-law and the husband can perceive leaving a young son
at home as neglecting one’s duties, so women with young children are often unable to leave
the house for extended periods of time, such as to attend program meetings. On the other
7For women with no sons, I set the age of sons to zero. I separately controlled for number of sons in all
regressions.
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hand, women who spend more time in the forest collecting firewood may feel more isolated
and may be more interested in the community-building activities of the program. The
3SLS results using age of sons and time to collect firewood as instruments were
qualitatively very similar to the ones presented above. However, I choose to highlight the
results using the alternative instrument described above because it relies on program rules,
and satisfies the exclusion restriction more clearly.
Interaction Terms with Brahmin Dummy
I tried several specifications that included interaction terms of the Brahmin caste dummy
with other right hand side variables. In the specifications using age of sons and time to
collect firewood as instruments for participation, these interaction terms improved the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), although the terms were never significantly different
from zero. In the specification using the exposure to the program instrument, the
interaction terms increased the AIC and remained insignificant. As a result, the
specification I report below does not include the interaction terms.
Tobit Approach
Since the dairy consumption variable has 240 zeros, I tried an IV Tobit specification. In
addition to the own participation instruments, I used predicted friends’ participation and
predicted interaction terms as instrument for the remaining endogenous variables. The
results were qualitatively similar to the 3SLS results presented above. I focus on the 3SLS
results because the 3SLS does not require estimating all instrumented variables on the
same set of regressors.
4.9 Conclusion
This paper is the first to study how peer networks affect female bargaining power and child
welfare. I do so using primary data that map self-reported networks; the data were
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collected in rural north India. I use a community-level women’s empowerment program,
Mahila Samakhya, to identify shocks to female bargaining power and networks. Using a
3SLS approach and network-weighted instrumental variables, I find that participation in
the community-level intervention empowers women, and that more empowered women have
better-fed children. I further decompose the peer effect into its component mechanisms of
social learning, social influence, identity utility, and social norms. I find that social learning
and social influence increase participation in a national rural employment guarantee
scheme, and the ability to travel without permission. I also find that social learning,
identity utility, and social norms significantly improve children’s consumption of rice and
dairy.
These results highlight the importance of peer networks, and suggest that female
empowerment and child nutrition interventions may benefit from accounting for social
learning and influence. Programs that harness the power of networks may be effective at
removing cultural barriers, such as constricting social norms, to development goals.
Further, programs that take into account the peer effect may benefit from differentiating
between the different mechanisms through which peer networks work. For example,
programs that rely on social learning, i.e. ones that target lower educated women through
their weak ties could just target a small number of well-placed women in a village. Such
programs might include interventions aimed at increasing female labor force participation
or improving children’s food consumption or health outcomes. On the other hand,
programs that rely on social influence or identity utility, such as interventions aimed at
improving female mobility or physical independence may target clusters of villages to build
up critical mass.
This analysis is, of course, not without caveats. The paper would benefit from panel
data tracking women and their peer networks. Ideally, I would be able to randomize an
intervention such as a literacy camp or support group participation at the friend level, and
follow their effect on individuals across time. Further, the limited snowball sampling
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strategy employed in data collection means that the results are not representative of the
average Indian woman, or even the average Uttarakhandi. Generalizations of these results
must therefore involve caution.
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4.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Inefficiencies Can Constrain and Lower the Household Production Possibilities
Frontier
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Figure 4.2: Inefficiencies Can Constrain and Lower the Household Production Possibilities
Frontier
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Figure 4.3: Inefficiencies Can Constrain and Lower the Household Production Possibilities
Frontier
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics Using a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Respondent’s Age 472 32.18 8.11 20 65
Husband’s Age 437 37.89 9.25 23 80
Respondent’s Age at Marriage 463 19.25 3.34 1 30
Average age of sons 487 8.05 7.79 0 36
Average age of daughters 487 6.18 6.70 0 30
Respondent’s Years of Education 397 8.82 4.06 0 17
Husband’s Years of Education 414 10.13 3.68 1 17
Sons’ Years of Education 443 7.04 4.34 1 17
Daughters’ Years of Education 355 6.73 4.23 1 17
Number of Rooms 487 3.33 2.12 0 19
Electrification 487 0.89 0.31 0 1
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Table 4.2: Female Bargaining Power: Dependent Variables from a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India,
2009-2010
Dependent Variables Percent Answering Yes
Respondent Has NREGS ID Card
All 60.62
Non-participants 48.94
Participants 68.02
Respondent Can Go Out Without Permission
All 70.89
Non-participants 58.82
Participants 78.17
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Table 4.3: Child Food Intake in Past Day: Dependent Variables Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
Dependent Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rice
All 1.00 1.42 0 7
Non-participants 0.83 1.34 0 6
Participants 1.11 1.46 0 7
Lentil
All 0.78 1.29 0 5.5
Non-participants 0.59 1.11 0 4
Participants 0.89 1.38 0 5.5
Dairy
All 1.03 1.72 0 16
Non-participants 0.79 1.41 0 10
Participants 1.17 1.88 0 16
Table 4.4: Summary of Mechanism Identification Strategy
Mechanism Proxy Interactions
Social Learning Less than four years of education Own Part.; Friends’ Part.
Social Influence Spousal Age Ratio Own Participation
Identity Utility Friends’ Opinion (Women) Own Part.; Friends’ Part.
Norms Villagers’ Opinion (Men) Own Part.; Friends’ Part.
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Table 4.5: Expected Signs on on Key Independent Variables
Independent Variable Learning Influence Identity Norms Expected Sign
Utility
Low Education Yes No No No Negative
Low Educ.* Own Part. Yes No No No Positive
Low Educ.* Friends’ Part. Yes No No No Positive
Spousal Age Ratio No Yes No No Negative
Age Ratio* Own Part. No Yes No No Positive
Friends’ Opinion (Women) No No Yes No Positive
Friends’ Opinion*Own Part. No No Yes No Positive
Friends’ Opinion*Friends’ Part. No No Yes No Positive
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) No No No Yes Negative
Villagers’ Opinion*Own Part. No No No Yes Negative
Villagers’ Opinion*Friends’ Part. No No No Yes Positive
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Table 4.6: Female Bargaining Power: Program-related OLS Results Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Participation 0.197∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.107∗ -0.137
(3.16) (2.12) (1.76) (-0.40)
Friends’ Participation -0.015 -0.005 0.0004 0.006
(-1.29) (-0.40) (0.03) (0.43)
Own*Friends’ Part. 0.015 0.018 0.006 0.0166
(1.02) (1.21) (0.40) (1.03)
Low Education 0.045 0.090 0.065 0.153
(0.81) (0.91) (1.19) (1.52)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.071 0.364 -0.489∗ -0.661∗
(0.26) (1.03) (-1.72) (-1.77)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.076 -0.048 0.258∗∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.98) (-0.44) (3.39) (1.86)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.230∗∗∗ -0.162 -0.235∗∗∗ -0.149
(-3.03) (-1.59) (-3.13) (-1.48)
Own Part.*Low Ed. 0.044 -0.093
(0.35) (-0.70)
Friends’ Part*Low Ed. -0.022 -0.014
(-1.15) (-0.66)
Own Part.*Age Ratio -0.693∗ 0.244
(-1.76) (0.62)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.6 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Part*Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.078 -0.035
(0.52) (-0.21)
Friends’ Part*Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.029 0.037
(1.19) (1.23)
Own Part*Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.084 0.099
(0.59) (0.65)
Friends’ Part*Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.044∗ -0.059∗
(-1.70) (-1.96)
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
107
Table 4.7: Female Bargaining Power: Program-related 3SLS Results Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Participation 0.583 -1.397 0.641∗ 5.558∗∗∗
(1.43) (-0.71) (1.90) (3.33)
Friends’ Participation -0.064 -0.005 0.025 0.072∗∗∗
(-1.49) (-0.17) (0.51) (2.65)
Own*Friends’ Participation 0.085 -0.095 -0.046 -0.181∗∗∗
(1.00) (-1.42) (-0.55) (-2.85)
Low Education 0.007 -0.348∗ 0.029 -0.338
(0.12) (-1.86) (0.47) (-1.50)
Spousal Age Ratio -0.179 -1.993∗ -0.615∗ 2.062∗∗
(-0.61) (-1.76) (-1.88) (2.07)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.042 -0.715∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.252
(0.43) (-3.57) (2.10) (1.19)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.212∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.193∗∗ -0.0779
(-2.43) (-0.80) (-2.31) (-0.45)
Own Part.* Low Educ. 0.417 0.462
(0.95) (0.87)
Friends’ Part.* Low Educ. 0.009 -0.008
(0.19) (-0.13)
Own Part.* Age Ratio 2.836 -4.959∗∗∗
(1.30) (-2.70)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Part.*Friends’ Op. 1.217∗∗ -0.507
(2.44) (-0.67)
Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Op. 0.009 0.103
(0.16) (1.03)
Own Part.* Villagers’ Op. -0.378 -0.083
(-0.75) (-0.10)
Friends’ Part.* Villagers’ Op. 0.014 -0.0376
(0.20) (-0.35)
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.8: Female Bargaining Power: Marginal Effects Using a Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Permission
Base Effects
Effect of Own Participation on Average Respondent -1.717 4.946∗∗∗
(1.91) (1.61)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Average Respondent -0.063∗∗ -0.040∗
(0.023) (0.02)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Participants -0.099∗∗ -0.110∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Non-participants -0.005 0.072∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Social Learning
Effect of Own Participation on Women with Low Education -1.283 5.684∗∗∗
(1.99) (1.71)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Women with Low Education -0.002 0.069∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Participants with Low Education -0.002 0.069∗∗
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.8 – Continued
NREGS Permission
(0.03) (0.03)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Non-participants with Low Education -0.003 0.069∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Social Influence
Effect of Own Participation on Average Respondent (Age Ratio) 1.024∗∗ 1.326∗∗
(0.46) (0.43)
Identity Utility
Effect of Own Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Average Respondent) -0.986 5.387∗∗∗
(1.97) (1.66)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Average Respondent) -0.002 0.106∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Participants) -0.002 0.107∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Non-participant) -0.002 0.105∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Continued on Next Page. . .
111
Table 4.8 – Continued
NREGS Permission
Norms
Effect of Own Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.’s husband) -1.543 5.526∗∗∗
(1.96) (1.69)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.’s husband) 0.0004 0.057
(0.05) (0.05)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Part.’s husband) 0.0003 0.057
(0.05) (0.05)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Non-part.’s husband) 0.001 0.056
(0.05) (0.05)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.9: Child Food Intake: Program-related OLS Results Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Mech. Base Mech. Base Mech.
Own Part. 0.125∗ 0.478 0.0838 0.611 0.157∗∗ 0.616
(1.91) (1.11) (1.31) (1.43) (2.45) (1.42)
Friends’ Part. 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.019 -0.000 -0.001
(0.58) (0.38) (1.13) (1.14) (-0.03) (-0.04)
Low Educ. 0.027 -0.089 0.065 0.023 -0.057 -0.089
(0.38) (-0.70) (0.92) (0.18) (-0.82) (-0.69)
Age Ratio 0.927∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗ 0.656∗ 0.862∗ 0.665∗ 0.779∗
(2.63) (2.24) (1.86) (1.93) (1.88) (1.72)
Friends’ Op. (Women) 0.111 -0.173 0.085 -0.125 0.207∗∗ 0.031
(1.17) (-1.28) (0.89) (-0.94) (2.17) (0.23)
Villagers’ Op. (Men) 0.147 0.268∗∗ 0.105 0.145 0.126 0.339∗∗∗
(1.55) (2.13) (1.11) (1.15) (1.33) (2.64)
Own Part.* 0.048 -0.114 -0.062
Low Educ. (0.29) (-0.70) (-0.37)
Friends’ Part.* 0.0154 0.0212 0.0150
Low Educ. (0.61) (0.85) (0.60)
Own Part. -0.547 -0.594 -0.569
Age Ratio (-1.09) (-1.19) (-1.13)
Own Part.* 0.183 -0.025 0.131
Friends’ Op. (Women) (0.97) (-0.13) (0.69)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.9 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Mech. Base Mech. Base Mech.
Friends’ Part. * 0.068∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.0491
Friends’ Op. (Women) (2.12) (2.06) (1.52)
Own Part.* 0.094 0.231 -0.110
Villagers’ Op. (Men) (0.54) (1.32) (-0.62)
Friends’ Part.* -0.074∗∗ -0.057∗ -0.064∗
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) (-2.17) (-1.68) (-1.88)
Own*Friends’ Part. 0.0002 -0.026 0.008
(0.01) (-1.38) (0.45)
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.10: Child Food Intake: Program-related 3SLS Base Regressions Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation 0.129 -0.036 -0.135
(0.60) (-0.20) (-0.72)
Friends’ Participation 0.006 0.009 -0.009
(0.38) (0.67) (-0.59)
Low Education 0.011 0.056 -0.052
(0.15) (0.75) (-0.69)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.845∗∗ 0.582 0.655∗
(2.35) (1.64) (1.81)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.109 0.088 0.226∗∗
(1.14) (0.92) (2.33)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.140 0.086 0.102
(1.47) (0.89) (1.05)
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Friends’ Opinoin (Women): importance
of friends’ opinion to woman. Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.11: Child Food Intake: Program-related 3SLS Mechanisms Results Using a
Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation 5.750∗ 1.121 11.74∗∗∗
(1.70) (0.32) (2.91)
Friends’ Participation 0.014 -0.016 0.031
(0.30) (-0.34) (0.57)
Low Education -0.514∗∗ -0.208 -0.670∗∗
(-2.16) (-0.86) (-2.45)
Own Part.* Low Educ. 0.796 -0.132 1.057
(1.33) (-0.22) (1.53)
Friends’ Part.* Low Educ. -0.027 0.080 -0.065
(-0.39) (1.11) (-0.79)
Spousal Age Ratio 3.473∗ 0.683 6.474∗∗∗
(1.88) (0.36) (2.87)
Own Age 0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(4.96) (3.93) (1.73)
Own Part. * Age Ratio -5.915∗ -0.406 -12.04∗∗∗
(-1.68) (-0.11) (-2.80)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) -0.200 -0.154 0.311
(-0.83) (-0.65) (1.10)
Own Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women) -0.0632 0.170 -0.335
(-0.09) (0.26) (-0.44)
Friends’ Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.137∗ 0.042 0.098
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.11 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(1.74) (0.53) (1.09)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.335∗ 0.244 0.602∗∗∗
(1.84) (1.40) (2.95)
Own Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.231 -0.513 -0.840
(0.36) (-0.81) (-1.14)
Friends’ Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.118 0.035 -0.034
(-1.26) (0.38) (-0.32)
Own*Friends’ Part. -0.061 -0.062 -0.127
(-0.64) (-0.66) (-1.14)
Observations 383 383 383
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.12: Child Food Intake: Marginal Effects
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Effects
Effect of Own Participation on Average Respondent 5.543∗ 0.912 11.32∗∗∗
(3.18) (3.28) (3.82)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Average Respondent -0.24 -0.054∗∗ -0.048
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Participants -0.047 -0.078 -0.097
(0.06 (0.06 ) (0.07)
Effect Friends’ Participation on Non-participants 0.014 -0.016 0.031
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Social Learning
Effect of Own Participation on Women with Low Education 5.971∗ 1.085 12.03∗∗∗
(3.41) (3.52) (4.09)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Women with Low Education 0.007 0.006 0.013
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Friends’ Participation on Participants with Low Educ. 0.006 0.009 0.011
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.12 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Friends’ Participation on Non-participants with Low Educ. 0.008 0.003 0.016
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Social Influence
Effect of Own Participation on Average Respondents (Age Ratio) 0.703 0.775 1.474∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.59) (0.73)
Identity Utility
Effect of Own Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.) 5.729∗ -0.001 11.63∗∗∗
(3.39) (0.05) (4.05)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.)) 0.060 1.179 0.064
(0.09) (3.46) (0.05)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Participants) 0.062 -0.001 0.065
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Friends’ Opinion (Non-participants) 0.058 -0.002 0.062
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.12 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Norms
Effect of Own Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.’s husband) 5.839∗ 0.922 11.42∗∗∗
(3.33) (3.44) (3.99)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Avg. Resp.’s husband) -0.032 -0.002 0.017
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Opinion (Participants’ husbands) -0.031 -0.002 0.017
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Effect of Friends’ Participation on Villagers’ Op. (Non-part.’s husbands) -0.032 -0.002 0.017
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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4.11 Ancillary Tables
Table 4.13: Female Bargaining Power: OLS Regressions Using a Women’s Empowerment
Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Participation 0.197∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.107∗ -0.137
(3.16) (2.12) (1.76) (-0.40)
Friends’ Participation -0.015 -0.005 0.0004 0.006
(-1.29) (-0.40) (0.03) (0.43)
Own*Friends’ Part. 0.015 0.018 0.006 0.0166
(1.02) (1.21) (0.40) (1.03)
Low Education 0.045 0.090 0.065 0.153
(0.81) (0.91) (1.19) (1.52)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.071 0.364 -0.489∗ -0.661∗
(0.26) (1.03) (-1.72) (-1.77)
Own Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.16) (0.17) (-0.58) (-0.68)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.076 -0.048 0.258∗∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.98) (-0.44) (3.39) (1.86)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.230∗∗∗ -0.162 -0.235∗∗∗ -0.149
(-3.03) (-1.59) (-3.13) (-1.48)
Number of Children -0.002 -0.008 0.038 0.029
(-0.05) (-0.17) (0.88) (0.65)
Age of Children 0.007 0.006 0.0015 0.003
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.13 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
(1.43) (1.17) (0.31) (0.60)
Brahmin -0.217∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ 0.041 0.068
(-3.65) (-3.63) (0.69) (1.06)
Lives with In-laws 0.033 0.015 -0.058 -0.067
(0.65) (0.29) (-1.13) (-1.25)
Number of Rooms 0.004 0.008 -0.018 -0.019∗
(0.34) (0.68) (-1.64) (-1.65)
Electricity 0.033 0.006 0.205∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.47) (0.09) (3.04) (2.55)
Own Part.*Low Ed. 0.044 -0.093
(0.35) (-0.70)
Friends’ Part*Low Ed. -0.022 -0.014
(-1.15) (-0.66)
Own Part.*Age Ratio -0.693∗ 0.244
(-1.76) (0.62)
Own Part*Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.078 -0.035
(0.52) (-0.21)
Friends’ Part*Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.029 0.037
(1.19) (1.23)
Own Part*Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.084 0.099
(0.59) (0.65)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.13 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Friends’ Part*Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.044∗ -0.059∗
(-1.70) (-1.96)
Constant 0.365 0.128 0.996∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗
(1.43) (0.40) (3.83) (3.45)
Observations 419 403 390 375
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.14: Female Bargaining Power: 3SLS Regressions Using a Women’s Empowerment
Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Participation 0.583 -1.397 0.641∗ 5.558∗∗∗
(1.43) (-0.71) (1.90) (3.33)
Friends’ Participation -0.064 -0.005 0.025 0.072∗∗∗
(-1.49) (-0.17) (0.51) (2.65)
Own*Friends’ Participation 0.085 -0.095 -0.046 -0.181∗∗∗
(1.00) (-1.42) (-0.55) (-2.85)
Low Education 0.007 -0.348∗ 0.029 -0.338
(0.12) (-1.86) (0.47) (-1.50)
Spousal Age Ratio -0.179 -1.993∗ -0.615∗ 2.062∗∗
(-0.61) (-1.76) (-1.88) (2.07)
Own Age -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001
(-0.24) (0.82) (-0.89) (0.23)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.042 -0.715∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.252
(0.43) (-3.57) (2.10) (1.19)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.212∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.193∗∗ -0.0779
(-2.43) (-0.80) (-2.31) (-0.45)
Number of Children -0.017 -0.021 0.033 0.047
(-0.37) (-0.40) (0.69) (0.87)
Age of Children 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.001
(1.41) (0.46) (0.13) (-0.21)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.14 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Brahmin -0.312∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.073
(-4.39) (-4.04) (-0.73) (-0.78)
Lives with In-laws 0.083 0.074 -0.019 -0.079
(1.54) (1.08) (-0.34) (-1.14)
Number of Rooms 0.002 0.009 -0.016 -0.029∗∗
(0.14) (0.61) (-1.34) (-2.09)
Electricity 0.076 -0.014 0.220∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.97) (-0.17) (2.86) (2.81)
Own Part.* Low Educ. 0.417 0.462
(0.95) (0.87)
Friends’ Part.* Low Educ. 0.009 -0.008
(0.19) (-0.13)
Own Part.* Age Ratio 2.836 -4.959∗∗∗
(1.30) (-2.70)
Own Part.*Friends’ Op. 1.217∗∗ -0.507
(2.44) (-0.67)
Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Op. 0.009 0.103
(0.16) (1.03)
Own Part.* Villagers’ Op. -0.378 -0.083
(-0.75) (-0.10)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.14 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Friends’ Part.* Villagers’ Op. 0.014 -0.0376
(0.20) (-0.35)
Constant 0.314 1.915∗ 0.897∗∗∗ -1.544∗
(1.10) (1.92) (2.84) (-1.71)
Own*Friends’ Part.
Pred. Own*Friends’ Part. 0.347∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(4.99) (6.92) (7.30) (8.94)
Constant 2.126∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗ 1.804∗∗∗ 1.768∗∗∗
(9.90) (10.15) (8.16) (8.44)
Observations 419 403 390 375
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.15: Child Food Intake: OLS Regressions Using a Women’s Empowerment Study,
Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Mech. Base Mech. Base Mech.
Own Part. 0.125∗ 0.478 0.0838 0.611 0.157∗∗ 0.616
(1.91) (1.11) (1.31) (1.43) (2.45) (1.42)
Friends’ Part. 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.019 -0.000 -0.001
(0.58) (0.38) (1.13) (1.14) (-0.03) (-0.04)
Low Educ. 0.027 -0.089 0.065 0.023 -0.057 -0.089
(0.38) (-0.70) (0.92) (0.18) (-0.82) (-0.69)
Age Ratio 0.927∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗ 0.656∗ 0.862∗ 0.665∗ 0.779∗
(2.63) (2.24) (1.86) (1.93) (1.88) (1.72)
Own Age 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗
(4.58) (4.81) (3.90) (4.14) (1.79) (1.78)
Friends’ Op. (Women) 0.111 -0.173 0.085 -0.125 0.207∗∗ 0.031
(1.17) (-1.28) (0.89) (-0.94) (2.17) (0.23)
Villagers’ Op. (Men) 0.147 0.268∗∗ 0.105 0.145 0.126 0.339∗∗∗
(1.55) (2.13) (1.11) (1.15) (1.33) (2.64)
No. of Children -0.029 -0.028 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.028
(-0.50) (-0.47) (0.58) (0.58) (0.61) (0.46)
Age of Children -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.013∗ -0.012
(-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.71) (-0.52) (-1.75) (-1.58)
Brahmin -0.225∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.143∗ -0.126 -0.018 0.034
(-3.02) (-2.60) (-1.93) (-1.63) (-0.25) (0.43)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.15 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Mech. Base Mech. Base Mech.
In-laws 0.048 0.034 0.085 0.084 0.018 0.007
(0.76) (0.52) (1.34) (1.30) (0.28) (0.10)
No. of Rooms 0.027∗ 0.027∗ 0.015 0.007 0.022 0.020
(1.96) (1.86) (1.06) (0.44) (1.60) (1.35)
Electrification -0.144 -0.186∗∗ -0.138 -0.167∗ -0.064 -0.096
(-1.61) (-2.06) (-1.55) (-1.86) (-0.71) (-1.05)
Own Part.* 0.048 -0.114 -0.062
Low Educ. (0.29) (-0.70) (-0.37)
Friends’ Part.* 0.0154 0.0212 0.0150
Low Educ. (0.61) (0.85) (0.60)
Own Part. -0.547 -0.594 -0.569
Age Ratio (-1.09) (-1.19) (-1.13)
Own Part.* 0.183 -0.025 0.131
Friends’ Op. (Women) (0.97) (-0.13) (0.69)
Friends’ Part. * 0.068∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.0491
Friends’ Op. (Women) (2.12) (2.06) (1.52)
Own Part.* 0.094 0.231 -0.110
Villagers’ Op. (Men) (0.54) (1.32) (-0.62)
Friends’ Part.* -0.074∗∗ -0.057∗ -0.064∗
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) (-2.17) (-1.68) (-1.88)
Own*Friends’ Part. 0.0002 -0.026 0.008
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.15 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Base Mech. Base Mech. Base Mech.
(0.01) (-1.38) (0.45)
Wife’s Rice Cons. 0.001 -0.002
(0.04) (-0.10)
Husb.’s Rice Cons. -0.004 -0.003
(-0.32) (-0.20)
Wife’s Lentil Cons. 0.031∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(2.04) (2.52)
Husb.’s Lentil Cons. -0.016 -0.019
(-0.92) (-1.08)
Wife’s Dairy Cons. 0.038∗ 0.032
(1.77) (1.43)
Husb.’s Dairy Cons. -0.008 0.002
(-0.34) (0.07)
Constant -1.048∗∗∗ -1.027∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗ -0.580∗ -0.655
(-3.20) (-2.50) (-2.85) (-2.59) (-1.78) (-1.57)
Observations 398 383 398 383 398 383
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.16: Child Food Intake: 3SLS Base Regressions Using a Women’s Empowerment
Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation 0.129 -0.036 -0.135
(0.60) (-0.20) (-0.72)
Friends’ Participation 0.006 0.009 -0.009
(0.38) (0.67) (-0.59)
Low Education 0.011 0.056 -0.052
(0.15) (0.75) (-0.69)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.845∗∗ 0.582 0.655∗
(2.35) (1.64) (1.81)
Own Age 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(4.73) (4.07) (2.04)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.109 0.088 0.226∗∗
(1.14) (0.92) (2.33)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.140 0.086 0.102
(1.47) (0.89) (1.05)
Number of Children -0.027 0.033 0.038
(-0.45) (0.56) (0.62)
Age of Children -0.003 -0.004 -0.013∗
(-0.34) (-0.50) (-1.75)
Brahmin -0.213∗∗ -0.086 0.069
(-2.07) (-0.93) (0.73)
Lives with In-laws 0.051 0.069 -0.018
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.16 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(0.71) (1.02) (-0.26)
Number of Rooms 0.029∗∗ 0.010 0.022
(1.98) (0.70) (1.51)
Electrified -0.166∗ -0.170∗ -0.113
(-1.76) (-1.87) (-1.22)
Wife’s Rice Consumption -0.004
(-0.16)
Husband’s Rice Consumption -0.002
(-0.09)
Wife’s Lentil Consumption 0.037∗∗
(2.40)
Husband’s Lentil Consumption -0.016
(-0.90)
Wife’s Dairy Consumption 0.036∗
(1.66)
Husband’s Dairy Consumption -0.001
(-0.04)
Constant -0.986∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗ -0.357
(-2.93) (-2.31) (-1.04)
Observations 383 383 383
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Friends’ Opinoin (Women): importance
of friends’ opinion to woman. Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.17: Child Food Intake: 3SLS Mechanisms Regressions Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation 5.750∗ 1.121 11.74∗∗∗
(1.70) (0.32) (2.91)
Friends’ Participation 0.014 -0.016 0.031
(0.30) (-0.34) (0.57)
Low Education -0.514∗∗ -0.208 -0.670∗∗
(-2.16) (-0.86) (-2.45)
Own Part.* Low Educ. 0.796 -0.132 1.057
(1.33) (-0.22) (1.53)
Friends’ Part.* Low Educ. -0.027 0.080 -0.065
(-0.39) (1.11) (-0.79)
Spousal Age Ratio 3.473∗ 0.683 6.474∗∗∗
(1.88) (0.36) (2.87)
Own Age 0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(4.96) (3.93) (1.73)
Own Part. * Age Ratio -5.915∗ -0.406 -12.04∗∗∗
(-1.68) (-0.11) (-2.80)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) -0.200 -0.154 0.311
(-0.83) (-0.65) (1.10)
Own Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women) -0.0632 0.170 -0.335
(-0.09) (0.26) (-0.44)
Friends’ Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.137∗ 0.042 0.098
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.17 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(1.74) (0.53) (1.09)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.335∗ 0.244 0.602∗∗∗
(1.84) (1.40) (2.95)
Own Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.231 -0.513 -0.840
(0.36) (-0.81) (-1.14)
Friends’ Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.118 0.035 -0.034
(-1.26) (0.38) (-0.32)
Own*Friends’ Part. -0.061 -0.062 -0.127
(-0.64) (-0.66) (-1.14)
Number of Children 0.005 0.032 0.084
(0.07) (0.44) (0.99)
Age of Children -0.009 -0.007 -0.022∗
(-0.96) (-0.79) (-1.96)
Brahmin -0.322∗∗∗ -0.187∗ -0.115
(-2.83) (-1.78) (-0.87)
Lives with In-laws 0.034 0.095 -0.036
(0.41) (1.15) (-0.36)
Number of Rooms 0.006 0.006 -0.018
(0.33) (0.34) (-0.80)
Electrification -0.128 -0.151 0.030
(-1.32) (-1.63) (0.26)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.17 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Wife’s Rice Cons. -0.023
(-0.96)
Husband’s Rice Cons. 0.011
(0.61)
Wife’s Lentil Cons. 0.044∗
(1.93)
Husband’s Lentil Cons. -0.020
(-1.08)
Wife’s Dairy Cons. 0.081∗∗
(2.42)
Husband’s Dairy Cons. -0.034
(-0.91)
Constant -3.353∗∗ -1.062 -6.005∗∗∗
(-1.97) (-0.59) (-2.89)
Observations 383 383 383
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.18: Female Bargaining Power: First Stage Results of 3SLS Regressions Using a
Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Own Participation
Participation IV -0.019∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-6.14) (-11.00) (-4.43) (-11.28)
Friends’ Participation 0.001 0.034∗∗∗ 0.009 0.0358∗∗∗
(0.17) (13.89) (1.42) (14.45)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.320 0.409∗∗∗ 0.397∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(1.47) (4.72) (1.73) (4.97)
Own Age 0.007∗∗ -0.00004 0.005∗ -0.00004
(2.40) (-0.06) (1.62) (-0.05)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.116∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(1.91) (3.46) (2.09) (3.49)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.036 -0.005 -0.038 -0.004
(-0.59) (-0.34) (-0.62) (-0.27)
Low Education 0.040 0.049∗∗∗ 0.054 0.052∗∗∗
(0.88) (4.26) (1.19) (4.02)
Number of Sons -0.014 -0.002 -0.019 0.001
(-0.61) (-0.25) (-0.83) (0.12)
Age of Sons 0.002 0.0001 0.002 0.0002
(0.49) (0.09) (0.65) (0.26)
Brahmin 0.186∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.18 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
(3.90) (10.65) (3.92) (10.80)
Lives with In-laws -0.077∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.081∗ -0.0827∗∗∗
(-1.88) (-7.21) (-1.92) (-6.78)
Number of Rooms -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.002
(-0.22) (1.29) (-0.46) (0.82)
Electricity -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(-0.13) (-0.58) (-0.13) (-0.63)
Constant 0.273 0.232∗∗∗ 0.216 0.205∗∗
(1.36) (2.89) (1.02) (2.43)
Friends’ Participation
Wwater*Part. IV -0.047
∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(-4.89) (-7.89) (-5.31) (-7.68)
Wcaste*Part. IV 0.029
∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(11.74) (14.03) (10.08) (11.76)
Constant 2.543∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗ 3.151∗∗∗
(10.76) (13.96) (10.47) (13.39)
Own*Friends’ Part.
Pred. Own*Friends’ Part. 0.347∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(4.99) (6.92) (7.30) (8.94)
Own Part.*Low Educ.
Pred. Own Part.* Low Educ. 0.944∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.18 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
(31.47) (31.78)
Constant 0.006 0.006
(0.55) (0.51)
Own Part.*Age Ratio
Pred. Own Part.*Age Ratio 0.788∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗
(14.49) (15.41)
Constant 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗
(3.23) (2.71)
Own Part.*Friends’ Op. (Women)
Pred. Own Part.*Friends’ Op. 0.938∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(37.00) (39.36)
Constant 0.013 0.011
(0.93) (0.81)
Own Part.* Villagers’ Op. (Men)
Pred. Own Part.* Villagers’ Op. 0.880∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(32.04) (33.41)
Constant 0.014 0.012
(0.96) (0.82)
Friends’ Part* Low Educ.
Pred. Friends’ Part* Low Educ. 1.029∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(26.60) (22.60)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.18 – Continued
NREGS Leave W/o Permission
Base Mechanism Base Mechanism
Constant 0.048 0.037
(0.62) (0.45)
Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Op. (Women)
Pred. Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Op. 0.946∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(35.56) (27.87)
Constant 0.131 0.140
(1.24) (1.24)
Friends’ Part*Villagers’ Op. (Men)
Pred. Friends’ Part*Villagers’ Op. 0.939∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗
(33.93) (28.70)
Constant 0.125 0.131
(1.11) (1.08)
Observations 419 403 390 375
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.19: Child Food Intake: First Stage of 3SLS Base Regressions Using a Women’s
Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation
Participation IV -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(-4.62) (-4.21) (-4.22)
Friends’ Participation -0.014 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(-1.33) (-2.92) (-2.71)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.444∗ 0.415 0.419
(1.66) (1.54) (1.55)
Own Age 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(2.19) (2.09) (2.09)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.063 0.068 0.067
(0.88) (0.94) (0.93)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.032 -0.040 -0.039
(-0.45) (-0.55) (-0.54)
Low Education 0.029 0.032 0.032
(0.52) (0.56) (0.56)
Age of Sons -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.23) (-0.31) (-0.35)
Number of Sons -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(-0.50) (-0.38) (-0.40)
Brahmin 0.233∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(3.88) (3.95) (3.91)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.19 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Lives with In-laws -0.126∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.127∗∗
(-2.58) (-2.56) (-2.57)
Number of Rooms 0.009 0.011 0.011
(0.84) (0.97) (0.96)
Electrification -0.083 -0.088 -0.087
(-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.28)
Constant 0.317 0.422∗ 0.410
(1.26) (1.66) (1.61)
Friends’ Participation
Wwater*Part. IV -0.077
∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(-6.22) (-5.92) (-5.97)
Wcaste*Part. IV 0.031
∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(11.03) (10.49) (10.57)
Constant 3.224∗∗∗ 3.210∗∗∗ 3.209∗∗∗
(10.92) (11.00) (10.98)
Observations 383 383 383
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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Table 4.20: Child Food Intake: First Stage of 3SLS Mechanisms Regressions Using a
Women’s Empowerment Study, Uttarakhand, India, 2009-2010
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Own Participation
Participation IV -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(-10.94) (-10.89) (-10.99)
Friends’ Part. 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(13.75) (13.68) (13.67)
Spousal Age Ratio 0.468∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(5.05) (5.00) (5.02)
Own Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.04)
Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(3.05) (3.04) (3.05)
Villagers’ Opinion (Men) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.37)
Low Educ. 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(4.27) (4.25) (4.26)
Age of Sons -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.02)
Number of Sons -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.15)
Brahmin 0.178∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(10.52) (10.48) (10.51)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.20 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
Lives with In-laws -0.085∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(-7.16) (-7.15) (-7.16)
Number of Rooms 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗
(1.79) (1.80) (1.79)
Electrification -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.77)
Constant 0.185∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(2.16) (2.21) (2.20)
Friends’ Participation
Wwater*Part. IV -0.044
∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(-6.77) (-6.77) (-6.78)
Wcaste*Part. IV 0.022
∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(15.18) (15.18) (15.19)
Constant 3.007∗∗∗ 3.007∗∗∗ 3.007∗∗∗
(14.21) (14.22) (14.21)
Own*Friends’ Part.
Pred. Own*Friends’ Part. 0.226 0.225 0.225
(0.87) (0.87) (0.87)
Constant 2.890∗∗∗ 2.890∗∗∗ 2.890∗∗∗
(15.14) (15.14) (15.14)
Own Part. *Low Educ.
Pred. Own Part. *Low Educ. 0.967∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.20 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(32.55) (32.55) (32.55)
Constant 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67)
Own Part.*Age Ratio
Pred. Own Part.*Age Ratio 0.819∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(14.60) (14.54) (14.57)
Constant 0.095∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(2.72) (2.78) (2.75)
Own Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women)
Pred. Own Part. *Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.933∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(35.91) (35.90) (35.90)
Constant 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.58) (0.59) (0.58)
Own Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men)
Pred. Own Part. *Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.870∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗
(30.65) (30.66) (30.65)
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.68) (0.68) (0.68)
Friends’ Part.*Low Educ.
Pred. Friends’ Part.*Low Educ. 1.031∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
(26.45) (26.44) (26.45)
Constant 0.063 0.063 0.063
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.20 – Continued
LN(Rice) LN(Lentil) LN(Dairy)
(0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Opinion (Women)
Pred. Friends’ Part.*Friends’ Opinion (Women) 0.917∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗
(33.68) (33.68) (33.68)
Constant 0.162 0.162 0.162
(1.47) (1.47) (1.47)
Friends’ Part.*Villagers’ Opinion (Men)
Pred. Friends’ Part.*Villagers’ Opinion (Men) 0.903∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗
(31.92) (31.93) (31.93)
Constant 0.158 0.158 0.158
(1.35) (1.35) (1.35)
Observations 383 383 383
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Friends’ Opinion (Women): importance of friends’ opinion to woman.
Villagers’ Opinion (Men): importance of villagers’ opinion to husband
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
India’s economic growth of the past two decades has been spectacular, and has included
increases in food grain production. However, over forty percent of all Indian children under
the age of five continue to be malnourished. To equitably distribute the benefits of growth,
Indian policy-makers must address the high rates of child malnutrition. This dissertation
examines two approaches to reducing child malnutrition: through nutritional
supplementation programs, and by using peers to empower women to control a greater
share of household resources.
Using nationally representative data from India, I evaluate the Indian Integrated Child
Development Services (ICDS), which aims to improve child nutrition by providing
nutritional supplements, and pre- and post-natal services to targeted villages. The ICDS
has been in place since 1977 and cost approximately $1.5 billion in 2008 alone. Previous
evaluations of the ICDS and similar programs elsewhere in the developing world have
largely failed to show the effectiveness of such interventions in improving child nutrition
outcomes. I use new data to re-evaluate ICDS on several dimensions. In contrast to
previous studies, I find that ICDS reduces long-run child malnutrition by six percent.
ICDS also significantly benefits the worst-off children, girls in particular. However, while
ICDS effectively targets poor areas, it fails to target areas with low levels of average
education or those with sex ratios that indicate female feticide and infanticide.
Next, I use primary data that map self-reported networks in rural north India to test
whether peer networks can empower women and improve child welfare. I use a
community-level women’s empowerment program, Mahila Samakhya, to identify shocks to
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female bargaining power and networks. Using a 3SLS approach and network-weighted
instrumental variables, I find that participation in the community-level intervention
empowers women, and that more empowered women have better-fed children.
Decomposing the peer effect into its component mechanisms, I find that social learning and
social influence through program participation increase access to outside employment, and
the ability to travel without permission. I also find that social learning, identity utility, and
social norms significantly improve children’s consumption of rice and dairy.
This dissertation highlights the importance of distributional effects in issues of
development economics. In particular, I estimate the effect of the ICDS program on the
worst-off children. We might not expect a nutrition program to improve the nutrition of
well-fed children; presumably the intended outcome is for the program to improve the lot of
those who currently face various degrees of malnutrition. My result that a nutrition
supplementation program like ICDS differentially affects children with varying levels of
stunting highlight the distributional impacts of such interventions. Further, I allow the
effect of the Mahila Samakhya program to vary by individual characteristics, such as initial
bargaining power, educational attainment, and identity utility. I find that this program
particularly helps women low level initial bargaining power. I also present evidence that
while the directly measurable interventions of ICDS and Mahila Samakhya are important
in improving child welfare and gender empowerment, so are the indirect peer effects: social
effects are important for participants and their non-participant friends.
By tracing networks, I exploit their overlapping nature and identify causal peer effects
on individual behavior. Identifying the causal effect in turn allows me to understand not
only whether networks and Mahila Samakhya increase female empowerment, but more
importantly how they do so. Decomposing the peer effect improves our understanding of
why networks influence individual behavior. The fourth chapter of this dissertation also
has implications for survey methodology, particularly in economics, because it traces
networks using a unique approach that combines snowball sampling with top-coding.
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The fourth chapter is important because it studies a unique program, Mahila Samakhya
and its effect on social networks in a rural and remote part of India. Mahila Samakhya is a
low-budget program that has strong potential to be duplicated elsewhere, hence evidence of
its success may help inform policies aimed at empowering women. My results suggest that
networks may help remove cultural barriers, like constricting social norms, to development
goals. Further, programs that account for the peer effect may benefit from differentiating
between the mechanisms through which peer networks work. For example, programs that
rely on social learning, i.e. ones that target lower educated women through their weak ties
could just target a small number of well-placed women in a village. Such programs might
include interventions aimed at increasing female labor force participation or improving
children’s food consumption or health outcomes. On the other hand, programs that rely on
social influence or identity utility, such as interventions aimed at improving female mobility
or physical independence may target clusters of villages to build up critical mass.
Finally, this dissertation contrasts the effectiveness of two programs that take very
different approaches to their implementation: the first, ICDS, relies on a top-down
approach, while the second, Mahila Samakhya, is grassroots up. The ICDS cannot
explicitly benefit from networks because the program is agnostic of existing networks.
However, the success of such a program is predicated on pre-existing networks and
word-of-mouth reviews of the program. Hence, even the ICDS likely implicitly benefits
from peer networks, and its effectiveness might be enhanced if it were to incorporate
networks in a more substantial way.
This dissertation studies how policy interventions and peer networks influence child
welfare and women’s empowerment. I use innovate econometric techniques on nationally
representative data as well as primary data to estimate the causal effects of interventions
and networks. My results highlight the importance of considering distributional and social
effects when evaluating the effectiveness of development programs.
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